24 Feb 2010

Charles Munger: A parable about how one nation came to financial ruin.

Basically, It's Over

A parable about how one nation came to financial ruin.

By Charles Munger

Updated Sunday, Feb. 21, 2010, at 3:30 PM ET
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In the early 1700s, Europeans discovered in the Pacific Ocean a large, unpopulated island with a temperate climate, rich in all nature's bounty except coal, oil, and natural gas. Reflecting its lack of civilization, they named this island "Basicland."

The Europeans rapidly repopulated Basicland, creating a new nation. They installed a system of government like that of the early United States. There was much encouragement of trade, and no internal tariff or other impediment to such trade. Property rights were greatly respected and strongly enforced. The banking system was simple. It adapted to a national ethos that sought to provide a sound currency, efficient trade, and ample loans for credit-worthy businesses while strongly discouraging loans to the incompetent or for ordinary daily purchases.

Moreover, almost no debt was used to purchase or carry securities or other investments, including real estate and tangible personal property. The one exception was the widespread presence of secured, high-down-payment, fully amortizing, fixed-rate loans on sound houses, other real estate, vehicles, and appliances, to be used by industrious persons who lived within their means. Speculation in Basicland's security and commodity markets was always rigorously discouraged and remained small. There was no trading in options on securities or in derivatives other than "plain vanilla" commodity contracts cleared through responsible exchanges under laws that greatly limited use of financial leverage.

In its first 150 years, the government of Basicland spent no more than 7 percent of its gross domestic product in providing its citizens with essential services such as fire protection, water, sewage and garbage removal, some education, defense forces, courts, and immigration control. A strong family-oriented culture emphasizing duty to relatives, plus considerable private charity, provided the only social safety net.

The tax system was also simple. In the early years, governmental revenues came almost entirely from import duties, and taxes received matched government expenditures. There was never much debt outstanding in the form of government bonds.

As Adam Smith would have expected, GDP per person grew steadily. Indeed, in the modern area it grew in real terms at 3 percent per year, decade after decade, until Basicland led the world in GDP per person. As this happened, taxes on sales, income, property, and payrolls were introduced. Eventually total taxes, matched by total government expenditures, amounted to 35 percent of GDP. The revenue from increased taxes was spent on more government-run education and a substantial government-run social safety net, including medical care and pensions.

A regular increase in such tax-financed government spending, under systems hard to "game" by the unworthy, was considered a moral imperative—a sort of egality-promoting national dividend—so long as growth of such spending was kept well below the growth rate of the country's GDP per person.

Basicland also sought to avoid trouble through a policy that kept imports and exports in near balance, with each amounting to about 25 percent of GDP. Some citizens were initially nervous because 60 percent of imports consisted of absolutely essential coal and oil. But, as the years rolled by with no terrible consequences from this dependency, such worry melted away.

Basicland was exceptionally creditworthy, with no significant deficit ever allowed. And the present value of large "off-book" promises to provide future medical care and pensions appeared unlikely to cause problems, given Basicland's steady 3 percent growth in GDP per person and restraint in making unfunded promises. Basicland seemed to have a system that would long assure its felicity and long induce other nations to follow its example—thus improving the welfare of all humanity.

But even a country as cautious, sound, and generous as Basicland could come to ruin if it failed to address the dangers that can be caused by the ordinary accidents of life. These dangers were significant by 2012, when the extreme prosperity of Basicland had created a peculiar outcome: As their affluence and leisure time grew, Basicland's citizens more and more whiled away their time in the excitement of casino gambling. Most casino revenue now came from bets on security prices under a system used in the 1920s in the United States and called "the bucket shop system."

The winnings of the casinos eventually amounted to 25 percent of Basicland's GDP, while 22 percent of all employee earnings in Basicland were paid to persons employed by the casinos (many of whom were engineers needed elsewhere). So much time was spent at casinos that it amounted to an average of five hours per day for every citizen of Basicland, including newborn babies and the comatose elderly. Many of the gamblers were highly talented engineers attracted partly by casino poker but mostly by bets available in the bucket shop systems, with the bets now called "financial derivatives."

Many people, particularly foreigners with savings to invest, regarded this situation as disgraceful. After all, they reasoned, it was just common sense for lenders to avoid gambling addicts. As a result, almost all foreigners avoided holding Basicland's currency or owning its bonds. They feared big trouble if the gambling-addicted citizens of Basicland were suddenly faced with hardship.

And then came the twin shocks. Hydrocarbon prices rose to new highs. And in Basicland's export markets there was a dramatic increase in low-cost competition from developing countries. It was soon obvious that the same exports that had formerly amounted to 25 percent of Basicland's GDP would now only amount to 10 percent. Meanwhile, hydrocarbon imports would amount to 30 percent of GDP, instead of 15 percent. Suddenly Basicland had to come up with 30 percent of its GDP every year, in foreign currency, to pay its creditors.

How was Basicland to adjust to this brutal new reality? This problem so stumped Basicland's politicians that they asked for advice from Benfranklin Leekwanyou Vokker, an old man who was considered so virtuous and wise that he was often called the "Good Father." Such consultations were rare. Politicians usually ignored the Good Father because he made no campaign contributions.

Among the suggestions of the Good Father were the following. First, he suggested that Basicland change its laws. It should strongly discourage casino gambling, partly through a complete ban on the trading in financial derivatives, and it should encourage former casino employees—and former casino patrons—to produce and sell items that foreigners were willing to buy. Second, as this change was sure to be painful, he suggested that Basicland's citizens cheerfully embrace their fate. After all, he observed, a man diagnosed with lung cancer is willing to quit smoking and undergo surgery because it is likely to prolong his life.

The views of the Good Father drew some approval, mostly from people who admired the fiscal virtue of the Romans during the Punic Wars. But others, including many of Basicland's prominent economists, had strong objections. These economists had intense faith that any outcome at all in a free market—even wild growth in casino gambling—is constructive. Indeed, these economists were so committed to their basic faith that they looked forward to the day when Basicland would expand real securities trading, as a percentage of securities outstanding, by a factor of 100, so that it could match the speculation level present in the United States just before onslaught of the Great Recession that began in 2008.

The strong faith of these Basicland economists in the beneficence of hypergambling in both securities and financial derivatives stemmed from their utter rejection of the ideas of the great and long-dead economist who had known the most about hyperspeculation, John Maynard Keynes. Keynes had famously said, "When the capital development of a country is the byproduct of the operations of a casino, the job is likely to be ill done." It was easy for these economists to dismiss such a sentence because securities had been so long associated with respectable wealth, and financial derivatives seemed so similar to securities.

Basicland's investment and commercial bankers were hostile to change. Like the objecting economists, the bankers wanted change exactly opposite to change wanted by the Good Father. Such bankers provided constructive services to Basicland. But they had only moderate earnings, which they deeply resented because Basicland's casinos—which provided no such constructive services—reported immoderate earnings from their bucket-shop systems. Moreover, foreign investment bankers had also reported immoderate earnings after building their own bucket-shop systems—and carefully obscuring this fact with ingenious twaddle, including claims that rational risk-management systems were in place, supervised by perfect regulators. Naturally, the ambitious Basicland bankers desired to prosper like the foreign bankers. And so they came to believe that the Good Father lacked any understanding of important and eternal causes of human progress that the bankers were trying to serve by creating more bucket shops in Basicland.

Of course, the most effective political opposition to change came from the gambling casinos themselves. This was not surprising, as at least one casino was located in each legislative district. The casinos resented being compared with cancer when they saw themselves as part of a long-established industry that provided harmless pleasure while improving the thinking skills of its customers.

As it worked out, the politicians ignored the Good Father one more time, and the Basicland banks were allowed to open bucket shops and to finance the purchase and carry of real securities with extreme financial leverage. A couple of economic messes followed, during which every constituency tried to avoid hardship by deflecting it to others. Much counterproductive governmental action was taken, and the country's credit was reduced to tatters. Basicland is now under new management, using a new governmental system. It also has a new nickname: Sorrowland.

Become a fan of Slate on Facebook. Follow us on Twitter.

Charles Munger is vice chairman of Berkshire Hathaway.

Article URL: http://www.slate.com/id/2245328/


Copyright 2010 Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Co. LLC




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16 Feb 2010

盘口语言

盘口语言,盘面语言(技术分析)




111 主动卖盘盘面可能预示下跌,将还有更低的买点,主动买盘预示可能即将拉升.

1111 主动卖盘盘面可能预示下跌,将还有更低的买点,主动买盘预示可能即将拉升,如果是在历史高位,此波段可能结束.

333 预示即将上涨,无论买卖盘

555 预示即将上涨,无论买卖盘 卖盘机构吸筹阶段,买盘有人愿意接盘

999 9999 本庄家筹码用完,下庄接手

888 都可

444 4444 恶庄, 不是疯买就是疯卖,特别是4444

168 如果高位,放大量卖出(配合成交量),小量不错

158 1558 1588 建仓初期, 中期出现

777 7777 248 一手一手庄家可能对碰,尤其是777 两个庄家都要买方 都在同一时间买

5858 可能出现慢牛

6868 在高位出现不好

123 顺利 尤其789

1414 可能打架,出现代码相同的股数,一般没有问题

248 碰上的都是恶人

4或6、8等3个以上数字重叠和连用,通常均为盘口语言,444或4444多表示强庄示警,表明此股已有机构坐庄;6、8重叠或与4连用如4466、4488等多表示主力态度或通知关系仓或锁仓机构,挂卖单表示将拉升,挂买单表示将打压;

  3个以上1重叠可能是压盘或洗盘信号,请关系仓协打压或保持股价;

  跌停在卖二或卖三、卖四挂重叠8或间隔0,如808,请关系仓协助拉抬护盘;

  3个以上3或9表示拉升或出货倒计时。其中末尾数字不定,可表示约定时间,如3336可能表示6分钟(或小时)后拉升,9则是出货信号;

  7结尾表示下一步约定,与4或8结合挂卖单表示请关系仓协助打压,如4007挂卖二表示请关系仓压盘或在某一点位出货,807挂买单表示请合作机构拉抬到某一点位;

  12345或54321以及其中的3位以上多表示操盘手与关系仓或新机构的交流,具体内容结合当时盘面的买卖大单等情况有所不同,可能是拉升或出货试盘信号,在得到对方回应后,开始拉升或出货;

  其实机构交流的方式很多,通常操盘手都有自己的语言或约定的信号,甚至约定按照通用语言的“反信号”来操作,所谓通用语言一旦被破译也就没有意思了。因此,上面说的大可不必太认真,大家留心看,还能发现不少盘口语言呢




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5 Feb 2010

张五常: 从神州误导地球说先进制度的不济

从神州误导地球说先进制度的不济

2010-02-02 08:35:31

归档在 五常谈经济 | 浏览 67339 次 | 评论 0 条


金融危机出现一年多了,这里那里复苏的言论时有所闻,但各方君子的看法很不一致。好比美国最近公布上季的国民收入,同比上升了百分之五点七,二○○三年以来的最大升幅,是代表着经济复苏吗?不一定。几个月前A. Binder教授指出,依照美国的统计算法,只要经济止跌,国民收入一定跳升。另一方面,美国的朋友还是一致认为,那里的市面继续一片萧条,找工难望,看不到有复苏的迹象。

统计数字不容易作得准。八十年代后期日本的经济遇难,其后复苏之声时有所闻。二十多年过去了,没有谁会说日本真的复苏过。一位常访日本的朋友最近再访,回来后对我说,二十多年来日本的楼价没有上升过。这可见统计数字的波动与大势的转变是两回事。

是的,金融事发到今天,整个地球只有一个国家的经济复苏没有争议:中国。神州大地的国民收入增长保八可以不论,楼价急速地回升至历史最高水平,甚或过之,而汽车的销售量同比上升了百分之四十六,去年销量远超于历来冠军但遇上不幸的美国。汽车的平均质量应该不及美国那么好,但加税后,同样汽车之价中国比美国高出不止一倍。我最喜欢采用的数据是厂房的租金,这些日子收复了一半以上的失地。民工荒又再出现了。

中国的经济奇迹早就把老外吓破了胆,金融危机后,表现一枝独秀更使他们啧啧称奇。不幸的是他们指鹿为马,或误中副车,频频指着北京的四万亿花得够快是中国复苏得快的主要原因。他们是说,北京的四万亿行动证明着凯恩斯学派历来主张的财政政策(fiscal policy)给中国证实了是对的。没有疑问,金融风暴以还凯恩斯学派再抬头,而支持的证据主要是中国。

神州误导地球也是没有疑问的。让我分点说说吧。

一、金融危机起于毒资产的出现,而中国的毒资产不多:没有一家中资银行受到毒资产的威胁而近于倒闭。换言之,从金融那方面看,中国受到的负面影响虽然不小,但没有西方那么严重。


二、中国的经济大为不妥出现在雷曼兄弟事发之前,主要的负面影响有二。甲、新《劳动会同法》引进;乙、人民币兑美元升值。这些是搬起石头砸自己的脚,我早就大声疾呼。暗渡陈仓,这两方面北京能及时处理,虽然我认为这些处理还不足够。换言之,正在急速下跌的经济本来就与金融危机无关,而处理得及时经济回升是理所当然的。


三、北京的四万亿政策不是凯恩斯学派主张的派钱或乱花一通,而主要是早有策划的基建项目。例如高铁的全国性发展及上海虹桥的交通枢纽,类同的工程人类历史没有见过那么庞大的,不可能是临急抱佛脚的发明。早有预谋,遇到地球金融危机立刻加速,浪费的成分不多。北京的「独裁」本领,是加速加得快,快得有点离奇。
先进之邦不会有像中国那种发展中国家的基建项目,而就是可以立刻想得出来,应该建造,但要立刻建造谈何容易?先进难进,要通过的手续不知多少重,环保有几关,工会有几关,集资有几关,居民有几关,都要过,而就是全部过了,动工后压力团体可以把项目杀下马来。这里我不是说中国的制度比先进之邦的好,而是中国要快可以快。当然,快可以闯祸,但这不是问题的重点。问题的重点是没有人提出过的:凯恩斯学派主张的政府花钱当然也要快,但在先进之邦的政制下,政府可以快花钱的项目只限于没有足够的反对声浪的范畴。年多前美国决定拜凯氏为师,花钱救市,通过第一关的竟然包括安全套产出的补贴。

早有细心策划的花钱可能错,不需要征求民意的花钱可能错,要迎合利益团体的花钱也可能错——哪一类出错的机会最高读者猜猜吧。还有一点是,北京的本领不仅是要花就花,而且是要不花就不花。不能肯定是好制度,但从年多来我观察到的农业补贴的几次剎掣衡量,北京不蠢。

四、北京决定推出四万亿之际,因为新劳动法及其他原因,回乡归故里的工厂员工数以百万计。四万亿的推出有协助就业之效。今天工业的民工荒再现,证明着反对凯氏的财政政策的西方学者没有分析错:这政策有挤迫效应(crowding out effect)。换言之,如果没有新劳动法惹来的祸,中国的四万亿推出会有更为明显的挤迫效应。


五、美国联储局大事放宽货币供应的约束,把银行向联储借钱的利率减至历史新低,但银行不愿意放宽贷款,购买房子及商业用途利率高企于五厘以上。这使银行赚大钱。某些机构及某些人士借钱买股票远为容易,导致那里的股市回升。中国呢?政府要挽救楼市,说借银行就借。楼价于是急速回升。最近北京又要再打楼市。地区政府呢?不到两年前中过计,如惊弓之鸟,有抗衡的味道。楼价该为何上苍也可能不知道,但中国的银行借贷的决策显然与西方的有别。


六、不到一年前,一些北京君子见外资撤离神州,问我意见。我说外资会回头。果然,这些日子外资进入神州者众。在金融危机阴影未除的情况下,中国是个避离所,而老外的光顾对中国的经济有助。


财政政策——不是指处理财政,而是指花钱刺激经济的那种——无疑起自凯恩斯,其无数弊端经济学者早就说得一清二楚。货币政策(monetary policy)主要起自佛利民。西方的经验说,在无锚货币(fiat money)的制度下,货币政策不能不用。我拜服佛老,但西方的经验告诉我们,在无锚货币下,或小或大的错,货币政策不断地出现。这些经验,加上二十多年来中国的经验给我的启发,使我想到用一篮子物品的可以在市场成交的物价指数为货币之锚,持久地稳定着物价,完善地发挥着货币的功能,货币政策可以不用当然不要用了(详尽的分析见拙作《货币战略论》)。


不用财政政策也不用货币政策,要用什么政策来处理或调控经济呢?用改善制度运作的政策。我认为,也坚信,中国的前途要集中在这后者。


人类历史有两大文化。其一是欧洲(这包括美国),其二是中国。回顾这两大文化的发展,所有繁华昌盛逾百年的时代都没有今天吵得热闹的财政政策及货币政策。持久的昌盛永远是基于制度上有可观的发展。可惜在人口急升的情况下,用作货币本位的金或银之量不足,出现困境。然而,没有本位的困境从来没有解决过。我们要想出另一种可以持久地稳定物价或币值之锚,作为间接的货币本位。


我不仅认为财政及货币政策可以不用不要用,而且认为这些政策扰乱了制度的运作。历史的经验说,最低工资、工会势力、压力团体、福利经济,等等,都是在有财政及货币政策的干预下出现的。我们要帮助那些因为天生有缺陷而不能自食其力的人,但历史的经验说,除了在制度上给予穷人自力更生的机会,所有扶贫政策都害了穷人,因为一律是为压力团体的利益而逼出来的。




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4 Feb 2010

就加快经济发展方式转变重点工作提8点意见

胡锦涛:就加快经济发展方式转变重点工作提8点意见
紧紧抓住历史机遇承担起历史使命 毫不动摇地加快经济发展方式转变
吴邦国温家宝贾庆林李长春李克强贺国强周永康出席 习近平主持

2010年02月04日00:00 来源:人民网

胡锦涛指出,转变经济发展方式,关键是要在“加快”上下功夫、见实效。

他就加快经济发展方式转变重点工作提出8点意见。


第一,加快推进经济结构调整,把调整经济结构作为转变经济发展方式的战略重点,按照优化需求结构、供给结构、要素投入结构的方向和基本要求,加快调整国民收入分配结构,加快调整城乡结构,加快推进城镇化,加快调整区域经济结构和国土开发空间结构,既着眼于化解过去积累的矛盾和问题,又为经济不断迈上新台阶、长期保持平稳较快发展创造条件。


第二,加快推进产业结构调整,适应需求结构变化趋势,完善现代产业体系,加快推进传统产业技术改造,加快发展战略性新兴产业,加快发展服务业,促进三次产业在更高水平上协同发展,全面提升产业技术水平和国际竞争力。


第三,加快推进自主创新,紧紧抓住新一轮世界科技革命带来的战略机遇,更加注重自主创新,加快提高自主创新能力,加快科技成果向现实生产力转化,加快科技体制改革,加快建设宏大的创新型科技人才队伍,谋求经济长远发展主动权、形成长期竞争优势,为加快经济发展方式转变提供强有力的科技支撑。


第四,加快推进农业发展方式转变,坚持走中国特色农业现代化道路,加快构建粮食安全保障体系,加快构建现代农业产业体系,加快推进农业科技创新,加快推进农业经营体制机制创新,大幅提高农业综合生产能力,大幅降低农业生产经营成本,大幅增强农业可持续发展能力,全面提高农业现代化水平,扎实推进社会主义新农村建设。


第五,加快推进生态文明建设,深入实施可持续发展战略,大力推进资源节约型、环境友好型社会建设,加快推进节能减排,加快污染防治,加快建立资源节约型技术体系和生产体系,加快实施生态工程,推动整个社会走上生产发展、生活富裕、生态良好的文明发展道路。

第六,加快推进经济社会协调发展,针对社会发展和民生领域的突出问题,大力推进以改善民生为重点的社会建设,加快提高教育现代化水平,加快实施扩大就业的发展战略,加快社会保障体系建设,加快发展面向民生的公益性社会服务,更好推进经济社会协调发展。


第七,加快发展文化产业,在重视发展公益性文化事业的同时,坚持经济效益与社会效益相统一,深化文化体制改革,加快公共文化服务体系建设,加快发展经营性文化产业,加快开拓文化市场。


第八,加快推进对外经济发展方式转变,坚持对外开放的基本国策,坚持互利共赢的开放战略,统筹好国内发展和对外开放,加快调整出口贸易结构,加快调整进口贸易结构,加快提高利用外资质量和水平,加快实施“走出去”战略,不断提高开放型经济水平。


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