30 Jan 2008

優越感 - 傷人

別讓優越感傷了人



任何一席談話,你將可觀察到,由於優越感的驅使,即使是最微不足道的話題,也能引發最具傷害力的敵意。傷人的程度或許不同,不過造成的傷害卻是一樣的。例如,妳的好友興沖沖地打電話給妳,她用折價券到批發店買到許多便宜的保養品,而妳竟說:「噢!我只敢在有品牌的專櫃買,雖然價錢貴一點,可是對我來說還是值得的。」又如,別人有一隻土狗養的好好的,而你卻對他說,「我覺得,沒有血統證明的雜種狗不值得養。」這豈不是罵人不帶髒子嗎?諸類苛薄損人的話,比在廁所裡深呼吸還令人難受;不如早點敬而遠之,免得自食惡果。看看下面的故事,你將有所領悟。

有個婦人去看醫生:「你身體不舒服幾天了?」醫生問。

「已經五天了,起初我在對面的藥店買藥來吃,吃了四天,但是還沒好。」婦人回答。

這位醫生對那一家藥店的老闆不懷好意,他認為打擊這家藥店的機會來了,於是他神氣十足地說道:「你聽那一家藥店的話,一定會倒楣的,他什麼都不懂,只會胡亂瞎掰。」醫生話還沒說完,婦人就匆匆的要走了。

「太太,我還沒給你診斷,為什麼就要回去了呢?」

「因為我來這裡看病,是那家藥店老闆介紹的。」

伏爾泰也有相同的經驗,有一次他對一位朋友極力讚揚某作家。可是那位朋友聽了,卻說:「很奇怪,你把他說得這麼好,可是他卻說你是一個走江湖的騙子。」伏爾泰聽了,就說:「哦,我想也許我們兩個人都可能犯錯。」

你沒有必要在別人落榜當天,告訴他你金榜題名的喜悅。

誠懇的藝術,就是在正確的時機,向正確的人,說出正確的事。

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弱者的优越感

时间:2005-09-04

优越感一向被认为是强者的特权。然而,这实际上是一种错觉。在作为单独的理性个人,弱者流露出优越感或许被视为荒唐的“精神胜利法”,但在文明集团和社会阶层之间,这种景象就往往使人降低到群体无意识的程度,并往往伴随着灾难性的后果。

一、土耳其的轻蔑

1756年,正在持续衰落中的土耳其帝国被法国大使告知:法奥同盟正式宣告成立(这是欧洲外交史上的一个转折点)。但法国大使得到的是一个傲慢的答复:帝国政府“对一头猪和另一头猪的联合”不感兴趣。

考虑到1683年从维也纳城下败退后,奥斯曼土耳其帝国已经在欧洲文明面前开始了其衰亡崩坏的过程,并在不久后的19世纪成为一个任人宰割的病夫,土耳其当时的回答不但是草率、傲慢和对自身不利的,同时甚至是自取灭亡的。

这一回答是同7世纪以来一千年内伊斯兰文明对基督教文明的优势之上的。甚至在这个回答一百年后、欧洲的军事优势变得如此明显之时,中东的穆斯林仍不肯承认自己相对于西方已经丧失优越感。后来曾任普鲁士元帅的老毛奇1835年在君士坦丁堡时观察到:“在俄罗斯,外国人可能遭人嫉恨;在土耳其,外国人却被人瞧不起。土耳其人毫不犹豫地承认欧洲人在科学、技术、财富、胆量和气力等方面都比他们的民族强,但是,他们从来不认为法兰克人就会因此而把自己摆在同穆斯林同等的地位。”

这种姿态乍一看似乎费解,的确,很多民族在面对外族优势军事、力量时,可以表现出由衷的赞赏甚至钦佩,但这并不代表对异质文明的完全认同;在有的情况下,这反而激起一种混杂着自尊心、反感、内省的自我优越感,并促使他们反过来蔑视这种优势所代表的物质力量。

土耳其的以下反应是具有典型意义的:“由造炮和地形学转到知识和思想,我们发现在后两种领域中受到西方的影响要少得多,因为,正式在这两方面,穆斯林曾经最卓有成效地拒绝了基督教以及一切来自基督教的东西。尽管欧洲人在制造枪炮、钟表和印刷机等一类有用的东西上面,他们的手是很巧的,但是,他们终究还是不开化的、野蛮的异教徒,如果他们的历史、哲学、科学与文学确实存在的话,这些对于具有世界意义的那个伊斯兰帝国的人民来说,却也都是毫无价值的。”(Bernard Lewis《现代土耳其的兴起》)

二、弱者的回应

土耳其人的反应之所以具备典型意义,是因为它所代表的正是一种文明中心面对异质文明的优势时的典型困境,其傲慢的反应是各种因素综合的结果。

这也是我们所熟悉的:17世纪中国优势逐渐丧失后,“依然极度自信和独立”,《全球通史》的作者忍不住评价:“有史以来,从未有一个民族面对未来竟如此自信,却又如此缺乏根据。”1840年后,面对西方的军事优势,清朝士大夫开始的反应是认为洋人不过是“船坚炮利”、奇技淫巧而已,不是王道,不但君子不为,还会坏人心智。后来终于承认其军事优势,但仍认为西方可学的也只是这些技术而已,须“洋为中用”,论道德心智,不逮儒家文明远甚。严复的生平就是那个时代生动的写照:这个一度留学、译介西洋学术的先驱,晚年深入研究儒家,自觉与孔教的仁义王道相比,欧洲文明直是禽兽一般。

桑原骘藏《黄祸论》中曾引用一个故事:晚清时,英国汉学家理雅各曾会见一个中国高官(此人曾驻英国多年),被问及:阁下在中国已近三十年,通晓中国典籍,请问,中国与西洋比,何者为真正的文明之邦?理雅各答:抱歉,我认为是西方。对方解释,他指的不是军舰、铁道、轮船的多少,而是精神方面特别是道德方面的优劣。理雅各答:当然还是西方。对方问:道德如此高尚的贵国人,为何要将毒品鸦片强加于我?

即使是唯一一个摆脱了被殖民命运的非西方国家:日本,在这一点上的反应也是类似的。明治维新后,近代日本迅速引进了西方文明,但同时也高喊“和魂洋才”,其反应在本质上是双重和矛盾的:

日本对欧洲的认识是双重的,日本一方面把欧洲作为“文明的偶像”,另一方面又把欧洲看成利欲熏心的殖民主义者。……近代日本人的国际观是在“东洋对西洋、文明对野蛮”的框架内形成的。在道德划线时,日本把自己划归东洋。在按文明划线时,日本又将自己划归西洋。(王屏《近代日本的亚细亚主义》)

也就是说,在面对西方的军事、技术、经济等物质优势的同时,中国和日本一方面承认(开始也许不情愿,后来则是震惊),但另一面,又认为自己本身的文明具有相对的道德优势,而物质优势不过是形而下的工具,欧洲人不但利欲熏心,且是没有廉耻的、令人触目惊心的。——这导致两种看来顺理成章的推论:一、精神力量更强于物质;二、一旦我们具备这些物质力量,我们必然是比西方更完美的文明。

这种坚定的信念有时导致令人无法想象的狂热,如义和团运动的兴起,无法忽视的一点即是当时人普遍相信洋人伤天害理,而自己的精神足以克服洋人的物质优势。日本在二战中以劣势装备面对美苏军队的“英勇”表现,也含有这种精神至上的可悲信念,因此美军一名将领曾说:“Japanese is good fighter but poor soldier.”

此种精神在不久之前的中国也并不鲜见,我们虽没有贬称西方大国的联合是“猪和猪的联合”,但也将他们之间的争执说成是“狗咬狗”,断定西方文明已经烂到根底,不过是“垂而不死”罢了,革命(代表着一种精神信念)的最终胜利则必将是属于我们的。而西方的物质力量,即使发展到核武器,如***所说,也不过是“美国反动派用来唬人的一只纸老虎”罢了(吊诡的是,我们在战略上如此蔑视的这些物质力量如原子弹、卫星、导弹等,一旦自己拥有,却变得极其自豪)。我们的优越感一度竟达到这种程度:认为西方发达国家的人民“生活在水深火热之中”,因而需要我们这个第三世界国家的国际人道主义援助。

甚至在西方各大国之间,也时常表现出这种姿态。如美国在1894年就已经成为世界第一经济大国,但德国等欧洲列强却长期忽视它的巨大战争潜力,认为这不过是文化落后的暴发户、无可救药杂种文明;二战前日本也认为美国人畏战怕死,精神上不堪一击,即使物质优势也不足以弥补。而纳粹德国对苏联的兴起更是视而不见,希特勒说,他只要在苏联的大门上踹一脚,“整座房子就会倒塌下来。”

三、优越感:自我平衡和保护

弱者的优越感是一种人类普遍的感受,当然并不仅存在于国际政治之中。一个从乡下到城市的人,在眩惑于高度发达的物质文明时,有时也会萌生出极度的反感。从《圣经》里犹太人对道德沦丧的巴比伦的诅咒,到乡土文学中对农村的尽情歌颂,都流露出一种强烈的道德优越感。

固然,有时弱者的优越感仅仅是因为他并未意识到自己是弱者,例如正在衰落中的土耳其帝国和清王朝。毕竟,人要进行自我解剖和承认自己的失败,是一件不但艰难而且痛苦的事。这种痛苦的被迫过程通常是漫长和渐进的:先承认物质力量(其中军事往往是最先被关注到的)、其次承认有学习的地方,最后才承认自己的文明出了问题。

这经常是人们的本能反应:一个物质高度发达的陌生群体,往往被我们界定为在道德上不如我们。这种物质发达及其派生出来的奢靡、浪费、狡猾、缺乏勇气、冷漠……种种现象,被断言是丑恶和没落的,也是我们纯洁精神的敌人——而“我们”的优越感正是建立在精神和道德的基础上。

八世纪的突厥碑文上记载,突厥战败后,“贵族子弟,陷为唐奴,其清白女子,降作唐婢。”毫不奇怪,它将突厥失败的原因归结为“唐人狡猾”,腐蚀了游牧文明。汉人自居为“怀柔远人”的高度发达文明,在一些游牧民族看来,不但须加以蔑视,而且是非常危险的,金、元、清等异族王朝都曾屡次下令禁止女真、蒙古、满族习染汉族文化,因为以勇武精神为代表的非物质力量正是他们区别于被统治民族的优越感所在。

这种精神上的自我净化往往表现为对物质的高度排斥,V.S.奈保尔在《印度:受伤的文明》里说,印度的民族主义者并不为物质的贫困而难过,相反,印度的哲学和文明,以及这种“近乎神圣的贫穷,提供这一真理;印度曾经就是真理。”而“外在世界只有影响了内在世界的时候才算一回事。这是印度的体验方式。”在我看来,这种体验方式并不仅仅是印度的,而是全人类的,只不过程度轻重不同而已。

这种优越感和排斥的意识在一定程度上也需要依靠对陌生集团的丑恶想象来维持。在诸多的科幻电影中,我们遭遇的外星人物大多拥有高度发达的物质文明,只要他们愿意,可以轻而易举地在地球上如入无人之境,灭绝所有人类。但他们也许有强大的军事力量,但我们毫无争议地占有道德优势,他们不但相貌丑恶,而且常常道德沦丧、侵略成性……

“战略上蔑视”的优越感并不都是错误的。在一个弱势团体处于上升时期,这一点常常还是它最后战胜强敌的力量来源,甚至是其合法性的来源之一。例如苏联集团一旦对自己的意识形态最终获胜产生了动摇,对制度的优越性不再坚信,社会的崩溃过程就开始了。

对于一个亚文化群体来说,这种优越感也是必要的。犹太人如果不是坚信自己是上帝的选民,而当时比它强大的诸帝国如埃及、亚述等都将因道德沦丧而灭亡,恐怕早已消失。具有讽刺意味的是,有时正是胜利,带来更大的破坏性,因为优越性加上胜利,往往导致骄横和危机感的缺失,最终陷入败局。近代日本的命运和越战胜利后的越南,都是例子。1950年代,刘伯承主政军事学院时,请王耀武等国民党将领教授坦克等现代军事,一个解放军指挥官公开表达了自己的轻蔑:“当初我们小米步枪打赢了他们的坦克,这种军事理论有什么用?”——他的话提供了一个活生生的例子。

不过,任何事物都有两面性。这种弱者的优越感虽然常常成为阻挠改革的顽固力量,但却也保留了一种必要的自尊心,起到一种自我保护的平衡作用,提高士气,以免一个集团对自身完全丧失信心。在一个弱势群体挣扎上升的时期,它的利弊将交互出现,贯穿整个痛苦的妊娠过程。

维舟

29 Jan 2008

不卑不亢的品格

不卑不亢的品格


  平等待人,方可不卑不亢,极简单的道理,做起来很难。我看见许多很有学问,或很有能力,或地位已经很高的人,犹不能免,心甚惋惜之,此器量不足,根基不厚也。

  凡世间任何一个人,都是历经十月怀胎、痛苦分娩来到这个世界上,都是经过十八年成长来至我们面前,每个人背后都有一段丰富而艰难的历程,因此,我们应该对每个来至我们面前的人心存尊重。无论大人物,无论小人物,无论学者高官,无论农民商人,无论小姐乞丐,每个人都是赤条条来到世上,都得到过关爱和温暖,都背负过父母亲人的期望,都享有过童年,都憧憬过幸福生活,生活最后让有些人得享尊荣,让有些人堕落社会底层,但为了我们最初的平等,为了我们来之不易的过程,我们应当对每个人保持人格上的尊重,懂得平等待人。

  对大多数人而言,做到不卑很难。因为生活的磨炼终究会挫伤人少年时的锐气,而且为了生活,为了出人头地,往往不得不对某一群体的人毕恭毕敬。摆脱这种心理的办法,一是无所欲求,做到"人到无求品自高";一是刻意减几分傲气,留一身傲骨,有所不为,有所必为,靠自身境界的提高,达到处世平和而洒脱的境界。

  相对于不卑而言,做到不亢似乎更难。"打讨吃子骂穷人"是一般暴发户的普遍表现,往往越是对上司卑躬屈膝者,越是对不及己者趾高气扬。"亢"的来源有二:一是优越感,一是自卑感。我见过许多来自沿海大城市的同学,就因为放不下自己的优越感,所以对来自边远省份或农村的同学打心底里藐视,又见过许多名冠当代的学者恃才傲物、性格怪僻;我见过许多公务员,就因为感觉自己大材小用,整天不得不看上司脸色行事而产生自卑,转而把这种自卑发泄在基层人民、基层官员身上,只要逮着机会,必定把清洁工、服务员或老实巴交的农民训斥一番,又见过许多看门房的、公共汽车售票员、司机在他们能够颐指气使的田地里咆哮张狂。每当看到这样的人、这样的事,我就不禁感慨:"多大材,多大用。小人不可使得志啊!"这样的品性,已经使你的器量、能力大打折扣,再聪明、再能干,又有什么用呢?终非栋梁之材啊!

  以这样的标准,衡量周围人,我发现,堪做栋梁者,凤毛麟角。很多人很有才华,很有学问,很有能力,很有气魄,可惜只是做不到"不卑不亢",便使他堕为二流人物!所以,我把不卑不亢列为人品高下的第一准则。







^O^

28 Jan 2008

Facts about Brunei-Singapore Currency Arrangement

From Blog:
http://bruneiresources.blogspot.com/

Tuesday, May 09, 2006 http://bruneiresources.blogspot.com/2006/05/facts-about-brunei-singapore-currency_09.html

Facts about Brunei-Singapore Currency Arrangement

2007 marks the 40th Anniversary of Brunei-Singapore Currency Board arrangements - establishing currency parity between the two countries' currencies. These two currencies are probably the most unique in the world where you do not have to change currencies when travelling to either country. Malaysia used to be part of the original tripartite but left the arrangements sometimes in 1970s. Lately only the Euro is one of the other currencies which actually can be used in a number of countries in the Euro Zone.

One question that people who realised what's going on - is this good for Brunei? To answer that question, we have to do a short course in post-graduate financial economics. But I will try to lay out the salient points. Most countries in the world established either a flexible of fixed exchange rate. A fixed rate mens that government set a rate for the value of the currency and that currency can only be traded or exchange at that particular rate. A flexible rate means that the rate is dependent on the market rate. More demand for that currency means that the exchange rate will be higher. In practise most countries practised a controlled or managed flexible exchange rate meaning that the country decides roughly how much it wants the rate to be and will get the Central Bank (monetary policy) to intervene either by selling or buying the currency in order to affect the supply of that currency until the exchange rate is where they want it to be. Why is this important? A stable exchange rate is important for businesses and even personal. Think how much you have to save for your children's education in the future - you have to know roughly how much the rate would be so that you can save the right amount now.

What happened to the financial crisis in East Asia in the late 1990s? Exchange rates are dependent on how much people want to keep your currency. They will want it if they think that it will be stable - by looking at the country's economic fundamentals - interest rates, inflation rates, political stability, debts, GDP, income etc. Or if they think something will happen to the country eg. political crisis, lower income, they will speculate by 'attacking' it, that is, by selling the currency in droves. For example should a crisis happen (think Brunei - circa 1998 - crisis, low oil prices etc), had Brunei been on a flexible exchange rate, confidence may have suffered and Brunei's currency value in the eyes of the world would be lower and could be 'attacked'. One way to protect against being attacked is to defend it by the Central Bank intervention. But when the whole world is against you, there is no reserves large enough to defend it. Thailand and Indonesia tried it but did not succeed, wasting billions of dollars intervening in vain. Their currencies slumped during the crisis.

A currency board system is an alternative to either fixed or flexible. By tying the Brunei currency to the Singapore currency, Brunei is protected from such attacks on our currency. The downside is that if someone attacks the Singapore currency, ours will be under attack too. So far Singapore has managed to keep its currency fairly stable and hence ours too at the same time. Brunei does not have to spend billions intervening in the market protecting the Brunei currency. But the downside is that we cannot have any monetary policy. We can't control the interest rate through financial tools and we are dependent on Singapore for the actual value of the exchange rate. Given our dependent on oil income, our currency could be stronger now with the high oil price but equally could be weaker when oil prices go down but with a currency board in place, that does not happen.

So far it has been good for Brunei. However, by now you would have realised that this is a difficult policy issue and has many sides to it. So if you are in favour of one argument over the other, please consider all the alternatives and look at the economic fundamentals in Brunei before you jump into any conclusion.

Posted by BRUNEI resources at Tuesday, May 09, 2006



12 comments:
LSM said...
Although I'm not 100% sure, I think that scanning currency is equivalent to counterfeiting. I remember a Singaporean boy who scanned the $2 bill and showed it off to his classmate got into some serious trouble. For safety's sake, I suggest you remove the images of the money unless you know for sure that it's not illegal to keep them there.

Tuesday, May 09, 2006 7:58:00 AM
Anonymous said...
I think it clearly shows 'Not Legal' on the scanned dollar.

Tuesday, May 09, 2006 8:20:00 AM
LSM said...
Not on the back of the bill though.

Tuesday, May 09, 2006 10:33:00 AM
FlyBoy said...
I suddenly realise that this blog in fact all other blogs including my silly little blog is being monitored by big brother.

Tuesday, May 09, 2006 10:57:00 AM
BRUNEI resources said...
I find it interesting that what I am trying to point out is the the more important issue which is the ability or inability to control the value of your own currency. From the comments and the emails I received, people are more worried about whether the original scanned $1 note (in case anyone did not see it originally, it's an ancient $1 note to begin with, which is not even in use in circulation - it has the picture of the HM Sultan Haji Omarali Saifuddien) which I took from someone's website seems to be taking the central issue here. Which is more worrying? $1 note or control of currency? Hello people... are you all asleep or what?
PS. Just to satisfy you all, I have changed the picture.

Tuesday, May 09, 2006 5:21:00 PM
Anonymous said...
good article. But is it high time for Brunei to have its own Central Bank?

Tuesday, May 09, 2006 6:06:00 PM
LSM said...
@ bruneiresources

Point taken, dude, but "not in circulation" does not translate into "no longer legal tender". Coins with SOAS III were still acceptable (and probably still are) years after his abdication.

Anyway, don't think I don't value your posts, or this particular one, because I do. The problem is that, as you put it, you'd have to take a post-graduate course in economics to fully appreciate and understand the problem. Yes, most of us are aware that Brunei's currency is pegged to Singapore's but what are the repercussions? My introductory course to Economics didn't say, though you did provide a pretty good overview.

But I think you pretty much summed it up with this:

Given our [dependence] on oil income, our currency could be stronger now with the high oil price but equally could be weaker when oil prices go down...

I'm reminded of the sage advice "Don't place all your eggs in one basket." A better diversified economy would help buffer the blow from a dip in oil prices.

But I suppose the real question I find myself asking is after 40 years of being pegged to the Singapore dollar, is Brunei's economy in any better shape to fend for itself?

Tuesday, May 09, 2006 8:24:00 PM
BRUNEI resources said...
Yes LSM! That's the kind of comment, I was waiting for. Are we ready? Anyway, my apologies for the earlier outburst, stressful day. I shouldn't be checking comments that often. I miss my golf...

Tuesday, May 09, 2006 8:47:00 PM
Anonymous said...
"But I suppose the real question I find myself asking is after 40 years of being pegged to the Singapore dollar, is Brunei's economy in any better shape to fend for itself? "

Nope... last time the rumour was that someone wanted to stop the Bruneian dollar peg to the Singapore dollar inorder to inflate the Bruneian dollar (to buy things cheaper overseas?)... however, others argued back, its not sound.. it may go up for a while, but sooner or later, it will collapse... afterall, revealing the country's asset is a crime hence no one knows how much Brunei has...

so, keep the peg... lets have an 40 year anniversary.... at least when i go overseas, i can use the singapore currency with more ease... (haha)

Thursday, May 11, 2006 6:22:00 PM
Anonymous said...
That's a good economics crash course you've just given. I think what Brunei NEEDS now is a good research institute or think-tankers that do nothing but do research on subjects such as this. Debate or discussion of the pros and cons are only credible if we can back it up by proper research (I think we Bruneians love to discuss, just look at the hours of meetings we conduct). I am quite surprised until today no proper research has been conducted on this issue (and many other issues)!
So please Mr Brunei Resources, the next time u meet with those top-top decisionmakers, please suggest for a good think-tank institute.

Thursday, May 18, 2006 2:48:00 AM
Anonymous said...
actually there should be 3 think tanks by now. 1 has been setup at foreign affairs and the one at UBD and another one will be set up soon to take over from the ASEAN-EC Management centre

Monday, May 22, 2006 8:30:00 AM
Anonymous said...
3 think-tanks??? And no one has done any research on this subject?? Amazing.....I know there was one (foreign) lecturer who had a paper written on the currency arrangement, but he passed away many years ago. To date I havent seen any other research paper on the same subject. I guess this is not something worthy of a proper research, huh??

Tuesday, May 23, 2006 6:38:00 AM


--------------------

27 Jan 2008

Last days of the general: Suharto's legacy

Last days of the general: Suharto's legacy

Sun Jan 27, 2008 12:52pm

JAKARTA (Reuters) - Former president Suharto's stamp on Indonesia was so strong that a decade after his ouster as its leader, the world's fourth-most populous country is still struggling to deal with his legacy.

Suharto, who died on Sunday, ruled for 32 years. He boosted growth and kept a lid on communal violence, but left in his wake a brutal army, crippled economy, neutered political system, and dysfunctional national institutions.

"Suharto ran Indonesia like a mafia don," said Jeffrey Winters, professor of political economy at Northwestern University, Chicago.

"Everything turned on the don, all business went through the don, the don was the source of security, and he destroyed everything, parliament, the rule of law, the intellectual community, and turned the police and military into his personal instruments."

Not everyone agrees.

"Yes, there was corruption. Yes, he gave favours to his family and his friends. But there was real growth and real progress," Lee Kuan Yew, longtime autocratic prime minister of neighbouring Singapore, said after visiting Suharto's hospital bedside on Jan. 13.

"I think the people of Indonesia are lucky. They had a general in charge, had a team of competent administrators including a very good team of economists."

Suharto came to power in 1965, crushing what was officially described as a Beijing-backed communist coup. As many as 500,000 Indonesians suspected of being communists or sympathisers died in an army-inspired bloodbath in the following months.

Over the next three decades, his army continued to kill, on student campuses, in the rebellious provinces of Aceh and Papua, and in East Timor, where about 200,000 died from war and famine, as well as in "mysterious shootings" of criminals.

Elsewhere in the sprawling archipelago of 17,000 islands and 226 million people, much of his rule was relatively peaceful, but stability often came at the cost of repression of dissent.

Thousands of political prisoners were kept in labour camps on Buru Island, including Indonesia's best-known author Pramoedya Ananta Toer and other members of the intelligentsia.

Independent analysts and NGOs said violations of human rights were common. But Suharto never faced any charges for crimes against humanity.

By the time he stepped down, amid the social and economic chaos of 1998, many Indonesians summed up his era with the initials KKN, the local acronym for Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism. Transparency International ranked him as the world's top kleptocrat, with a fortune estimated at $15-35 billion.

He denied the charges of corruption, and partly because of claims of poor health he was not prosecuted.


SQUANDERED

Suharto's supporters -- and he had plenty in the West and in Asia -- pointed to the fact he encouraged foreign investment, boosted economic growth, and raised living standards.

He inherited an economic shambles from former president Sukarno, and turned Indonesia into one of Asia's tigers, growing 6-7 percent a year.

But many of his economic policies proved ill-conceived. He doled out licences and monopolies to his family and friends, stifling competition, and used costly fuel and food subsidies to win the support of the man on the street.

"The growth was enjoyed by the elite, and the benefits were not distributed among the poor," said Wimar Witoelar, a media commentator.

"You cannot separate his political and economic legacy, what is the value of economic growth when he killed, or damaged so many people?"

Corruption permeated all levels of society, including the courts and legal system, and became a way of life for many. Indonesia has had only limited success in tackling endemic graft, still cited as a major obstacle to investment.

In Jakarta, sleek skyscrapers towered above slums and open sewers, and millions lived on less than $2 a day, although in the countryside many farmers still remember his rule fondly as a time when they prospered.

When he resigned, the financial system was exposed as a mess. Banks had violated the most basic lending rules, steering huge loans to his cronies, who wouldn't or couldn't pay up.

Given Indonesia's oil, coal, copper and other resources, its growth fell far short of its potential, critics say.

"Suharto squandered Indonesia's best years, when it had ample oil and gas, and had very close ties to the United States and the West, with access to developmental funds at very cheap rates," said Winters. "The growth rate should have been much higher."

Subsequent governments have pushed through economic reforms, but Indonesia has taken years to recover. The economy expanded 6.3 percent in 2007, the fastest pace in 11 years, but still well below the kind of growth enjoyed by China and India.

The oligarchs who prospered under Suharto have bounced back from the 1997-98 financial crisis and once again rank among the country's wealthiest. Some escaped punishment, thanks to corrupt courts, but with Suharto's death that may change.

"It's not just Suharto's children, but the children-in-law and business associates who over the next few months will be far more vulnerable," said Richard Robison, emeritus professor at Murdoch University, Perth.

"The death of Suharto lifts the last protective cloak for these people," who may now face new charges or the more aggressive pursuit of existing cases, he added.


DEMOCRACY

Suharto employed his security forces and political machine Golkar to hold together a vast archipelago of assorted religions, languages, and cultures, while squashing serious opposition.

He continued to use Communism as a convenient bogeyman, and long after the Cold War ended, Indonesians deemed to have communist links were stigmatised and even denied jobs.

His authoritarian style prevented any democratic development. Opposition parties were crushed and while the country quickly embraced democracy in Suharto's wake, holding its first direct elections for president in 2004, its political parties remain immature and lacking in clear ideology.

The armed forces, which had a quota of seats in parliament, have been depoliticised, and are under pressure to get out of business. But Golkar remains a powerful force backed by wealthy businessmen.

As for its modern history, Indonesia has yet to conduct the painful self-scrutiny seen in post-Nazi Germany or post-apartheid South Africa. Schools have only recently started to teach an alternative version of the events of 1965-66.

"It's been largely expunged from the history books," said Damien Kingsbury, associate professor at Australia's Deakin University. "It's an indication of the reluctance to recognise the darker elements of Indonesian history."

The media, however, has flourished in the past decade and is now free to report on corruption and injustices, and, as Suharto lay dying in hospital in recent weeks, could cover every tiny, most intimate detail of the condition of an old general who for years ensured they were censored or shut down.



© Reuters2008All rights reserved

How low can bank shares go?

How low can bank shares go?

By Conrad de Aenlle Published: January 25, 2008

Shares of global banks continue to hit new lows as announcements of their exposure to losses in the credit markets continue to hit new highs.

The latest run occurred this month when Citigroup and Merrill Lynch each reported fourth-quarter shortfalls of $9.8 billion. The news left the two stocks, along with those of such big-name institutions as UBS, Deutsche Bank and Barclays, trading at, or within pennies of, their lowest levels of the last year. Citigroup, which had been weaker than its peers before the credit crisis struck, reached a nine-year low.

The pounding reflects not only losses just recorded but also those widely believed to be on the way. Fresh selling occurred after concerns emerged that companies that insure bonds might be unable to meet their own ever mounting obligations; that would leave banks, or anyone else holding the paper, further out of pocket.

Market bottoms often coincide with or shortly follow spikes in investor fear. Could the latest panic hint that a bottom for bank stocks is approaching?

The sector seems bereft at the moment, but there are several points in its favor, supporters say. For starters, the declines have left the stocks trading at very low valuations, even after accounting for huge losses this year.

Today in Your Money
The death of the 'decoupling' theory?Two cheers for stocksHow low can bank shares go?Citigroup and Merrill trade at barely eight times analysts' consensus estimate of earnings for 2008. The same goes for Deutsche, UBS, Credit Suisse and Banco Santander, while the forward price/earnings ratio at Barclays - estimated earnings per share divided by the current share price - is just over six.

Banks also have friends in high places: central banks that have been lowering interest rates to try to forestall recession. The most recent move was a three-quarters-percentage-point reduction on Tuesday by the Federal Reserve. The European Central Bank has been less eager to ease, but it has sent signals to the markets lately that it is closer to cutting rates than before.

Lower rates help banks by helping the economy and also by causing the yield curve to steepen. Because banks borrow short term and lend long term, their financing costs drop, and profitability improves, when short-term rates controlled by central banks come down.

Banks are held in such low regard that even when investment advisers express praise for them, it can come across more like scorn. Tim Guinness, chief investment officer of Guinness Atkinson Asset Management, holds Citigroup in part because "I think it's a bank that's far too large to be allowed to go bust," he said. Mustering a bit more optimism, he called Citigroup "the strongest bank in the world in terms of positioning, with a great international franchise and lots of customers," and said the stock "presents a sort of one-way bet" after losing more than half its value since June.

Another bank he favors, one that has been far less damaged by the credit crunch, is State Street. Its stock is up since June, before the crisis struck the industry, in part because much of its business involves bulletproof activities like providing administrative services for banks and insurance companies.

Jeremy Whitley, senior investment manager for global equities at Aberdeen Asset Management, likes a few banks operating in Asia, where growth is stronger and credit less crunchy. His firm holds Standard Chartered, a sort of Indiana Jones in pinstripes that focuses on emerging markets, and a couple of small institutions in Singapore, OCBC and UOB.

He is giving Western banks a wide berth, however. He views their multistage asset write-downs - some booked for the third quarter, now some for the fourth - as a way to try to cushion the blow for investors. "The markets can't take account of everything all in one go," Whitley said. "Banks realize that, so they don't tell them everything. If they did, the markets would implode, so they tell people what they feel they can handle at one time, then they come back with more a few months later."

If that is their intention, the tactic could backfire. Fear hurts stock prices, but confusion and uncertainty hurt more. The drip-feeding of grim financial results is like a horror film that offers only fleeting, incomplete glimpses of the monster, leaving the audience to imagine the worst.

Another reason that Whitley thinks banks are not telling investors everything is that they do not know everything.

"It will take a while for people to really understand how bad it's been," he said. "No one knows how big the numbers are."




^O^

26 Jan 2008

First Financings of A380 Attracts Higher Than Expected Rentals & Pricing



First Financings of A380 Attracts Higher Than Expected Rentals & Pricing

Jan 21, 2008 (Aircraft Value News/Access Intelligence via COMTEX) -- SGPJF | news | PowerRating | PR Charts -- According to reports, Airbus Financial Services has sold the first aircraft to be operated by Singapore Airlines for a purchase price of $198.6 million, representing a higher than expected price.

The first three aircraft to be delivered to SIA have been bought by Doric Asset Finance. While the price of the first aircraft is reportedly $198.6 million, the implication is that the base purchase price of the second and third aircraft will be the subject of some small indexation change due to the date of delivery. The first aircraft, acquired from Airbus Financial Services due to pre-existing delivery to Singapore Airlines, has been financed under a 10-year German operating lease, subject to a two-year lease extension option.

The second and third have been acquired direct from Airbus S.A. There has been considerable variation in values attributed to the A380 with some sources indicating approximately $160 million while others suggest in excess of $200 million. The 2007 list prices averages $314.5 million, suggesting an approximate 37 percent discount. The price includes buyer furnished equipment, which for the A380 can run into many millions of dollars.

The reported lease rental is $1.7 million a month. This is higher than might be expected for a lessee of Singapore Airlines caliber but perhaps is appropriate to mitigate some of the uncertainty facing residual values of the early build A380s in the years to come. The fixed rate of $1.7 million per month will therefore generate more than $200 million over 10 years, allowing residuals to be flexible.

Aircraft Value News, Vol. 17, No. 2




^O^

25 Jan 2008

Profitless Prosperity Haunts IC Industry

Profitless Prosperity Haunts IC Industry

Alexander E. Braun, Senior Editor -- Semiconductor International, 1/17/2008 http://www.semiconductor.net/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleID=CA6523410

Profit levels in the semiconductor industry have dropped to alarmingly low levels, said Steve Newberry, CEO at Lam Research Corp. (Fremont, Calif.). For more than half of the top 40 semiconductor companies, current levels of profitability are “minimally sufficient” to fund new investments, he said in a presentation at the SEMI Industry Strategy Symposium (ISS 2008), being held this week at Half Moon Bay, Calif.


Steve Newberry, CEO, Lam Research Corp.
“Although we’ve experienced unprecedented year-over-year IC unit growth, we’re trending toward an era of profitless prosperity,” he said, defined as an industry running flat out without generating sufficient return on investment (ROI) to build new facilities necessary to meet growing customer demand.

“We better figure out how to achieve pricing that enables sufficient profit, because there won’t be enough banks or fools that will continue loaning money to companies that cannot generate what they need to fund the business,” he said, adding that consolidation is necessary to improve the situation.

In 2004, 38 out of the 40 largest companies had positive operating profits; the industry average was 23%. Even then, Newberry said, two companies had negative operating profits, and 15 were between zero and 10, which is insufficient to sustain growth. For 2007, the average operating profit is 12%.

“We’re in a strong demand environment, and 15 of 40 companies have negative operating profits,” he said. “If you add the eight that are from 10 to zero, that’s 23; over half the companies are under the profit level needed to sustain business. If you exclude known profit leaders Intel Corp., Texas Instruments Inc., TSMC, the fabless companies and analog, there’s a -1% operating profit. Only nine companies have positive operating profits.”

Since January 2003, the industry’s IC unit yearly demand has grown faster than during the previous 12 years. “IC unit demand is growing, but revenue growth is lagging,” Newberry said. Since 1995, average selling prices (ASPs) have dropped too fast for the industry’s own good. The price-per-bit, per function, has declined faster than the cost-per-bit and function, he said.

From 1992 to 1997 demand rose sharply and ASPs grew significantly, then plunged. “Even so, the industry’s operating profit was strong enough at 20% to generate sufficient cash to self-fund business growth,” he said.

Over the past five years unit growth has been 14%, almost double the average IC unit growth rate from 1998 to 2002. Profitability shot up in 2004, and continued to do well in 2005 and 2006 in the face of declining ASPs caused by shortages in some rapidly growing segments.

However, for 2007, the industry’s average profitability is forecast to be ~12%. “This is minimally sufficient, overall, for the industry to self-fund,” he said.

Newberry said that one cannot be prosperous if the price-per-bit declines faster than the cost-per-bit, which historically has averaged ~30%. “Today, we have an even greater accelerated price-per-bit decline, and have a huge gap between price and cost. Memory manufacturers are in a death race to the bottom.”

Newberry indicated that over the past few years profits for advanced logic IDMs, DRAM and NAND have fallen from ~20% to ~4%; the NOR sector has been below positive operating profits for five years.

In memory, oversupply causes ASPs to degrade faster than costs drop. Too many players have easy access to capital and are able to quickly ramp production. As a result, supply increases faster than demand, even with 50% annual unit growth. Memory companies seek the perceived benefits of economies of scale and increased revenue from market-share gains, Newberry said.


Outside of a few healthy companies, many chip companies have insufficient profits.

For logic IDMs, Newberry said only one logic IDM has an operating profit greater than 10% — Texas Instruments. “Even so, TI, with an operating profit in the 20s, has again changed its business model. They went fab-lite and are now going fab-lighter. They increasingly resemble a fabless company.”

The foundry and fabless segments are over 20%: one is capital-intensive, the other R&D-intensive. The foundry segment seems healthy, but over the past five years, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (TSMC, Hsinchu, Taiwan) has profited. UMC (Hsinchu, Taiwan), Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. (SMIC, Shanghai) and Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing Ltd. (Singapore) have not.

“Cost isn’t the significant factor,” Newberry said. “TSMC gets a value leader price premium because of its library, product breadth and capability to deliver.” The microprocessor market looks good, with only two players. “Intel is eight times AMD’s size. So AMD’s strategy was to come up with a better processor,” Newberry said. “It worked until Intel price-nuked them. Now, AMD’s 2007 profitability is in the red.”

Newberry believes the industry must do more than focus on cost reduction. “We must promote market efficiency, global industry exchanges, extensive supply-and-demand inventory tracking, and practice financial discipline. We must develop better models to produce demand vs. supply forecasts. There’s too much capability chasing too little demand.”





^O^

24 Jan 2008

2007 Oct: An interview with Lee Kuan Yew

Tom Plate and Jeffrey Cole interview Lee Kuan Yew
Singapore's first prime minister talks about China, the United States, and international politics as well as the future of media in Asian countries like Singapore and around the world

By Tom Plate
Pacific Perspectives Columnist

Tuesday, October 9, 2007

This is the complete transcript of Minister Mentor (as the founder of modern singapore is now known) Lee Kuan Yew's interview with syndicated columnist Tom Plate of the UCLA Media Center and new-media expert Jeffrey Cole of the USC Annenberg School Center for the Digital Future. It took place on Sept. 27, 2007 in the minister's private office at Istana, Singapore.

Q: How are you?

Lee: Ageing rather fitfully as we all do, but when you're past 80, it's a pretty steep climb.

Q: The thing is you have not retired?

Lee: I think if you retire, the idea of just reading books and playing golf ... you just disintegrate.

Q: There's such a high correlation between people who retire and play golf and die, right? If you don't play golf and don't retire … follow the logic!

Lee: You have to have something more than that. You have got to wake up every morning feeling there's something worth doing and you're not just lying back and coasting along. Once you coast along, it's finished.

Q: It's great to be in Singapore right now because it's so bustling!

Lee: It's partly just sheer luck. I would say 60 percent hard work, 40 percent luck. Sixty percent because we put ourselves into this position, went through some very hard times starting with the Asian crisis, SARS and so on -- but we have got onto the right track. We could see China growing, India coming on. We're just at the junction of the two and placed ourselves to take the tailwind of both of them -- but keeping all our other bases intact, our connections: U.S., Europe, Japan.

Q: You even have good relations with Taiwan?

Lee: That's crucial. That's part of the old -- our past.

Q: But that's not all that easy to do?

Lee: It's still tough, but it doesn't matter. The mainland knows these were the terms on which we established relations with them.

Q: One of the first questions I asked you roughly 10 years ago when I started the column on Asia and America was what would be the one thing you would say to the American people about the United States' role in Asia. You thought for a few minutes and then you said: "Tell the American people that America must get the relationship with China right, because if that relationship is gotten right, it benefits everybody in Asia. And if it's not gotten right, it's going to create problems." Have we more or less got the relationship right?

Lee: I think it's not bad. Congress is in a fractious mood looking for excuses for what's gone wrong, believing China's exchange rate offers unfair advantage. Yes, the Chinese should up the value of their yuan -- maybe 10 percent, 15 percent -- but it's not going to help you. It's not going to solve the problem. It might create problems for them if they do it so suddenly. But if they do it gradually, I think it shouldn't be a problem.

Q: They probably will do it?

Lee: They'll do it gradually. They're scared of unemployment. They're scared of what happened to Japan when the factories relocated. They need their low-end jobs, making shoes, garments, whatever. If these factories move, you have got unemployment -- that's a real problem for them. They're scared of it as they're moving up-market. It's a new game for them and they're nervous. Their legitimacy depends upon solving the economic problems and not having riots in the cities even as their old state-owned enterprises retrench.

Q: What would you say to Americans who say if China rises, America has to fall?

Lee: No, I do not see a win-lose, zero sum game here. It was the U.S. that brought China into the World Trade Organization (WTO). It was George W. H. Bush that opened the door, invited China to start selling to America. That was carried on by President Clinton. Clinton finally, with his then Treasury Secretary Rubin, got the Chinese into WTO.

You have got two choices with China. Keep them out -- but the U.S. must have done its calculations, because if you keep them out, then you have them as a spoiler. They're going to do reverse engineering, steal your patents and where is the profit in that? You slow them down, there's no doubt about that. You slow down their transformation but at the same time, you are not benefiting from that transformation. If you go back and remember the 1980s and early 90s, you needed that market to grow but you never factored in the speed at which they would grow. That's scary. That's happened and I think they know that it's a difficult transformation for them. It's not easy. They have got enormous problems -- internal problems, disparity within the cities, between the cities and the countryside, and now with cell phones and satellite TV, they have to change track, instead of just going helter-skelter for gold … now they're talking about achieving a harmonious society.

Q: Do we on the whole know pretty much what the real picture inside China is?

Lee: I think your China-watchers are well briefed, they know.

Q: There shouldn't be any big surprises? We pretty much know where the tensions are?

Lee: [Nods affirmatively]

Q: You mentioned Bob Rubin and Clinton. The genius of their approach was they convinced the Chinese that it was in their interest to join WTO. They weren't doing anybody any favors, was it going to be good for China?

Lee: No, I think they had [Chinese Premier] Zhu Rongji to deal with and that made the difference. Zhu Rongji was the man who pushed the Chinese side. He was backed by [President] Jiang Zemin. He did the sums and decided that if China was going to catch up with the world, they had to open up and this will force a continual opening-up, joining WTO and having to abide by the rules -- and now they're in.

Q: You see them still going there -- going in that same opening-up direction?

Lee: Their problem now is convincing the world that they're serious about a "peaceful rise." These are thinking people. You're not dealing with ideologues.

I don't know if you've been seeing this or heard of this series that [the Chinese] produced called The Rise of the Great Nations. It's now on the History Channel. I got our station here to dub it in English and show it. It was quite I would say a bold decision to tell the Chinese people this is the way the European nations, the Russians and Japanese became great. Absolutely no ideology and they had a team of historians, their own historians. To get the program going, they went to each country, interviewed the leaders and historians of those countries.

You should watch the one on Britain, because I think that gives you an idea of how far they have gone in telling their people this is what made Britain great. I was quite surprised. The theme was [doing away with] the Divine Right of Kings, a Britain that was challenged by the barons who brought the king down to Runnymede and then they had the Magna Charta, and suddenly your "Divine Right" is based on Parliament and [the barons] are in Parliament. That gave the space for the barons to grow and the middle class eventually emerged. When the King got too uppity, Charles the First got beheaded.

Now this series was produced in a communist state, you know. In other words, if you want to be a great nation, so, if the leader goes against the people's interests, you may have to behead him! They also said that because there was growing confidence between the people and the leaders, the country grew.

It is in fact a lesson to support their gradual opening up and their idea of how they can do it without conflict -- the "peaceful rise." They have worked out this scheme, this theory, this doctrine to assure America and the world that they're going to play by the rules.

Q: You think they'll be able to do that fast enough to accommodate the middle class who want clean air and so much else?

Lee: I cannot say what they will do. I go there once in a year, I spend one week. I get reports, I read it but I'm not a China-watcher. I have got many other things to watch, I'm a Singapore-watcher! My guess is they're going to move pragmatically one step at a time and the first thing they are trying to do right at this moment is to get the succession to the next Standing Committee right. [The chairman will] have his team and the next five years will be his policy.

I think the policy will be let's grow, let's have more equality in the country and keep the country as one. Let's have no trouble abroad, let's make quite sure that Taiwan doesn't do stupid things which will force the mainland to act. Let's have a successful Olympics and then we are into a new age, one step at a time.

The first problem is blue skies for the Olympics, and the way to do that is the way they did it in 1999 when I went there for the 50th anniversary and I found blue skies. I asked our ambassador about this: He said they stopped all factories for the last two weeks. I think they're going to do that, maybe the last four weeks before and the cars will be cut down by half, odd and even numbers and so on. But to go and clean up properly will take umpteen years, retrofit coal mines and so on. That's a very costly and slow business.

They are engaging us in Singapore, and we're going to do an EcoCity with them, choosing the site now. They have agreed. They've offered us several sites and we're choosing one where there can be sustainable growth. What we've done in Singapore, we recycle water, you keep your air clean, you do this, you do that, higher costs, more social discipline, more engineering, sewers, recycling water, et cetera and so on. It's a slow process but they want to learn how it can be done. That's important.

Q: If we could move to the other superpower, the United States. I know you're reluctant to give out advice, unlike American journalists who always try to tell you what to do, but for America, since you've been a friend of America and you've seen it over decades, what are two, three things, that you worry about in America?

Lee: I think in the next 10 years you have got to extricate yourself from these problems in the Middle East. It may take you five years to get it stabilized and then after that, you gradually have more time and energy to think about the other big problems in the world. This is sucking up too much of your resources. To solve this, you have got to tackle the two-state problem in Israel because as long as that's festering away, you're giving your enemies in the Muslim world an endless provocation from which they can get new recruits for crazy adventures to try and knock you down, to blow themselves up and blow the world up. How you're going to do that, I don't know.

Q: Did you follow the Israeli lobby debate in the U.S.? Two professors -- from Harvard and the University of Chicago -- did this paper about the alleged extreme influence of the Israeli lobby in American foreign policy. Even if the paper overstated or used some unwise language in making its case, is there something to this?

Lee: You have got to settle this issue with the Jewish lobby. If you have this as a festering sore, you get Muslims entangled in hate campaigns. I'm not saying if you solve this, everything will be sweet and harmonious -- but if you solve this you will remove a cancer in the [international] system. Then you can better tackle the other problems. You are alone in this [Middle East policy] because the Europeans are not with you. Nobody helps you, but everybody doesn't want to openly oppose you.

Q: What about inside America itself? Do you see any indices that worry you, whether it's education?

Lee: For the next 10, 15, 20 years what you have will keep you going as the most enterprising, innovative economy with leading-edge technology, both in the civilian and military field. You have got that already.

You will lose that gradually over 30, 40, 50 years unless you are able to keep on attracting talent and that's the final contest, because what you have done, the Chinese and other nations are going to adopt parts of it to fit their circumstances and they are also going around looking for talented people and wanting to build up their innovative enterprising economies. And finally this is now an age where you will not have military contests between great nations because you will destroy each other, but you will have economic and technological contests between the great powers.

I see that as the main arena of competition by 2040, 2050 and it'll be the U.S.; China for sure; Japan, keeping up with the U.S. and trying to retain its separate position from China, closer to the U.S. and hoping to maintain a special position; India, somewhat behind China, trying to catch up. I don't know about Brazil.

Q: Charles de Gaulle had a great comment about Brazil. His advisers said to President de Gaulle that he had to go to Latin America -- Brazil. He said why? They said Brazil has great potential. De Gaulle said, "Ah, yes Brazil has great potential ... and always will."

Lee: I put my money on China, India and Western Europe. If Western Europe can get past the welfare approach to society and get their unions modernized, I think they have got the technological basis and the talent to rise again, not as a military power because I don't think they got the stomach for that, but as an economic power which they can do. I think they'll give the world a run for their money.

Can they do it? I don't know. Their history is so deep, you never know. Under pressure, as they feel they're being left behind by history, they may decide to do it. I mean, you look at [French President] Sarkozy, he may or may not succeed, but he's convinced himself and he's convincing quite a group of the French elite. The CEOs of the big multinationals in France don't need convincing. They know it. It's the broad think-tanks, the media, the intellectuals who still feel that they have a superior system. They loath having to give that [welfare approach] up, but they may, you know, because that's the only way to catch up.

Russia may become a player if they are able to find a way to convert the oil and gas into a more enterprising economy. I don't know if they can get out of their corruption and the mismanagement of the resources, but they have got talented people.

But long-term for America, if you ask me, say, project another 100 years, 150 years into the 22nd century, say, 2150, whether you stay on top depends upon the kind of society you will be because if the present trends continue, you'll have a Hispanic element in your society that's about 30, 40 percent. So, the question is do you make the Hispanics Anglo-Saxons in culture or do they make you more Latin American in culture."

Q: That is exactly the right question.

Lee: I mean, if they came in drips and drabs and you scatter them across America, then you will change their culture, but if they come in large numbers, like Miami, and they stay together, or in California, then their culture will continue and they may well affect the Anglo-Saxon culture around them. That's the real test.

But on the [China] side, you can be quite sure that their numbers are so great -- the Chinese Hans -- they can take any number of new migrants, they will be absorbed. So, long-term, I think the Chinese have figured this out. Then, if they just stay with "peaceful rise" and they just contest for first position economically and technologically, they cannot lose. If they are not Number One, they will be Number Two. If they are not Number Two, they are Number Three. They have figured that out.

Q: Singapore is one of the world's most wired countries, far ahead of the pack. How do you imagine over time that this will change Singapore? What will be your sense of what happens in an educated country with high standards, when anyone can get anything on the Web, videos and blogs so that the role of a centralized media become less and less dominant?

Lee: Well, it is already on its way because the print media here is not growing the same way, they are stagnating. It's not declining as fast as, say, it is in America or Britain ... And this is happening here.

The young, they read things on the Internet. I mean, I am part of the older generation. Yes, I read some stuff on the Internet, but at the end of the day, I say, well, let's see what the proper analysis is. So, I look up, I look at the editorial pages and the op-ed pages. I am not sure that the young will do that anymore, but the way the print media can stay in the contest is not to be the first with the news because that's not possible, but to be the first with the background and the analysis and the ones with the high credibility will stay in business.

You must have credibility because you get so much on the Internet. Whom do you believe? Finally, you've got to say, who is saying this? And you don't know. But if you say, this is The New York Times, this is the Washington Post or the L.A. Times, then you say, well, that is the standard.

I mean, that goes for every country, I think, but we have a different problem here because we are bilingual. English is our first language, well, for the younger generation. The older generation, Chinese was their first language, but the ones below 30 now, below 35, the majority, English is their first language and Chinese or Malay and whatever will be their second language. But with the rise of China, we are already seeing more and more going to China doing business and more Chinese coming here doing business. So, they are going to start reading the Chinese blogs, the Chinese news. It's already happening. So, the trend will be from print to screen.

Q: China has not given up hope in terms of trying to control the content on the Internet. But my sense since the last time I talked with you and with some of your brightest people, is that you have a sense of inevitably, that this new technology is going to overwhelm efforts to control it, is that right?

Lee: Right, it is not possible. Look, you are going to have a PDA that is also running video and you can have your servers blocked. But if you've got a 3G phone, you use another server, and so then you are through.

No, it's not only going to happen, it's already happening. Otherwise, how do you get all these pictures of the monks in Myanmar or Yangon or Mandalay coming out? It's all on cell-phones. Now, there are areas which are blocked out now. They are blacked out, sure, but they are still coming out because you've got a 3G phone and I am quite sure Reuters or whatever news agency must have given their correspondents and stringers, saying, here, use this. You take it and you use this and you get it through. Otherwise, how can you get it through because the government is already blocking out [communication]. Many of the areas are now non-functioning, you can't use the cell-phone. But images are still coming through. I just saw something this morning. So?

Q: Right. So, that the role of the centralized media is less important. Even if you can control the centralized media, that's less and less valuable than before.

Lee: I don't know if you've caught up with this story. It's a bit of scandal going on. [Former Deputy Prime Minister] Anwar Ibrahim leaked a video, an old video, way back in 1980, of an Indian lawyer talking to a top judge about how he can arrange to get him promoted to be the "Number One" or whatever. I think it was an eight-minute video and Anwar has now put it on the Internet and it's on YouTube! So the Malaysian bar -- which have already been dismayed at the degradation of their judiciary and the corruption and judge-buying and case-buying -- they have demanded a royal commission to inquire into the facts.

So, the government, under pressure now, has appointed a committee of judges and one eminent person, to check on the authenticity of this tape. So that's bought them some time, but in the meantime, 2,000 lawyers, following what the Pakistani lawyers did, have marched on to the prime minister's office to deliver a petition to investigate this matter. Now, this would not have happened without the Internet and without YouTube. I mean it is so simple, you see.

Q: That's a changing world.

Lee: But at the same time, there is the problem of credibility. So, you have a website called Malaysiakini. That means "Malaysia Now" and it's got some very good articles in it and some of them are signed regularly by the same person. So when we get that, we read it and then we say, okay, circulate it. But you get a lot of rubbish, too, and you have got to filter it. It's a waste of time.

Q: Well, your earlier point about the credibility of serious newspapers and serious magazines is more important now than ever.

Lee: You've got to go by them. You know, it's like the ratings agencies which put a lot of financial institutions down.

Q: This is the future of professional journalism, if there is any?

Lee: No, you'll always have it. But if we don't use this [new technology], then we are just one hand tied behind us: Should we allow our opponents to have that advantage? This is a highly competitive world. But the flood of information leads to overload. Therefore, you've got to have somebody filter it for you.

Q: Can I go back to your comment about Myanmar and the video that's getting out from the hand-helds, where, unlike Tiananmen in 1989, you cannot just pull the plug on all visuals. With regard to Myanmar -- and I realize anyone's guess is as good as anyone else's -- but did you see that it's plausible to ask China, as it did at the Six-Party Talks, in some way to work skillfully and work behind the scenes to assume a role in moving Myanmar forward out of the Middle Ages and maybe into the real world?

Lee: I'm not sure the Chinese have got that power. And in Myanmar, these are rather dumb generals when it comes to the economy.

Q: They are!

Lee: How they can so mismanage the economy and reach this stage when the country has so many natural resources?

Q: It's a gift!

Lee: It's stupid. So I'm not sure. The Chinese, they've tried, and, in fact, we have tried to talk them out of isolation. I tried through a general called Khin Nyunt. He's the most intelligent of the lot. I sold him the idea, or at least he bought the idea, that the way for them to go forward was to get out of uniform and do it like Suharto, form a party -- Golkar -- and then take over as a civilian party. But halfway through, Suharto fell. So, it ended up as the wrong advice, they back-tracked. Then they chucked Kyin Nyunt out.

Q: Timing is everything!

Lee: Meanwhile, I had advised several of our hoteliers to set up hotels there. They have sunk in millions of dollars there and now, their hotels are empty. But, you know, you've got really economically dumb people in charge. Why they believe they can keep their country cut off from the world like this indefinitely, I cannot understand. And you know, you need medicines -- they smuggle in from Thailand. It doesn't make sense.

We will see how it is, but whatever it is, I do not believe that they can survive indefinitely. Look, the day they decided to close down the government in Yangon and go into this Pyinmana, or whatever the place is called where there's nothing and they are putting up expensive buildings for themselves and a golf course -- and the top general had a lavish wedding for his daughter which was then out on YouTube -- the daughter was like a Christmas tree! Flaunting these excesses must push a hungry and impoverished people to revolt. But what will happen, I don't know because the army has got to be part of the solution. If the army is dissolved, the country has got nothing to govern itself because they have dismantled all administrative instruments.

Q: You have a candidate in the coming American presidential election that you prefer? You'd like to endorse whom? I have my candidate, but you've got to get American citizenship!

Lee: Who's your candidate?

Q: You! You've helped run this pretty well country for so many years.

Lee: You need to have an American who is not only good on television but he must have the networking that can raise him the funds and the grassroots support.

Q: I notice you said "him".

Lee: Well, her, him/her. No, [Hillary Clinton is] leading, she's leading. Will she be good for America?

Q: I don't know.

Lee: Sorry?

Q: What do you think? I'm too close to her.

Lee: What do you mean you're too close to her?

Q: I'm right there. I'm American, I'm right in the middle of it. I don't like any of them. She may be good enough, though she's not the best that we've got.

Lee: She's good enough?

Q: She's probably good enough.

Lee: Well, we have to live with whoever wins.

Q: I read somewhere recently that you actually have a bit of a worry about your country's survivability over the long run? Are you serious?

Lee: Singapore is not a 4,000-year culture. This is an immigrant community that started in 1819. It's a migrant community that left its moorings and therefore, knowing it's sailing to unchartered seas, guided by the stars, I say let's follow the stars and they said okay, let's try. And we've succeeded and here we are, but has it really taken root? No. It's just worked for the time being. If it doesn't work, again, we say let's try something else. This is not entrenched. This is not a 4,000-year society.

Q: You really have a sense of the country's endangerment.

Lee: Yes, of course.

Q: It's amazing, you come in here and you walk around here in one of the great cities in the world. Yet you are worried about survival.

Lee: Where are we? Are we in the Caribbean? Are we next to America like the Bahamas? Are we in the Mediterranean, like Malta, next to Italy? Are we like Hong Kong, next to China and therefore, will become part of China? We are in Southeast Asia, in the midst of a turbulent, volatile, unsettled region. Singapore is a superstructure built on what? On 700 square kilometers and a lot of smart ideas that have worked so far -- but the whole thing could come undone very quickly.

For this to work, you require a world where there are some rules of international law and there is a balance of forces of power that will enforce that international law and the U.S. is foremost in that. Without that balance of power and international law, the Vietnamese will still be in Cambodia and the Indonesians will still be in East Timor, right? Why are they out? Because there were certain norms that had to be observed. You can't just cross boundaries. This little island with four and a half million people, of whom 1.3 are foreigners working here, has got to maintain an army, navy and an air force. Can we withstand a concerted attempt to besiege us and blockade us? We can repel an attack, yes. Given the armed forces in the region and our capability, we can repel and we can damage them. Three weeks, food runs out, we are besieged, blockaded.

Q: Who will come after you? Who would come after you?

Lee: There are assets here to be captured, right?

Q: Some unnamed bad regime?

Lee: When [Malaysia] kicked us out [in 1965], the expectation was that we would fail and we will go back on their terms, not on the terms we agreed with them under the British. Our problems are not just between states, this is a problem between races and religions and civilizations. We are a standing indictment of all the things that they can be doing differently. They have got all the resources. If they would just educate the Chinese and Indians, use them and treat them as their citizens, they can equal us and even do better than us and we would be happy to rejoin them.

Q: Do you think it's healthy for the citizens of Singapore to feel that pressure, that tension that it all could change quickly? Do you think that makes them run this country more effectively, be better citizens by not getting complacent?

Lee: My generation, the ones above 50, who have lived through the first part, they know. The ones under 30 ,who've just grown up in stability and growth year by year, I think they think that I'm selling them a line just to make them work harder but they are wrong. The problem is they don't believe. They think I'm wrong. That's a problem that all countries face. You look at the Japanese, I remember their parents. After their defeat, they had great leaders not just in politics but in business at every level. They travel, they work, and they sold their goods like mad to rebuild Japan. Now you look at them ... You look at the younger generation, will they work like some of the fathers did? I don't think so, but in a corner will they do it again? I think yes because it's a deeply-imbedded culture. They will fight. That's the difference between an ancient culture and a new one. Theirs is embedded, ours is not. At the same time that ancient culture is preventing them from making rational decisions about migration, immigration and meeting the problems of ageing.

Q: Singapore's armed forces are in pretty good shape, right? So when are you all planning to invade neighboring Indonesia?

Lee [laughing]: All we want is a quiet peaceful world. We have made something of our lives and we'll be quite happy to carry on like this and help them get along and do better. We started this LKY School of Public Policy, giving them scholarships to prove to them it's done by good governance. It's not by robbing you.

Q: I (Plate) graduated from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton. And so I'm a big fan of public policy schools. I think you all are doing a great job at the Singapore policy school. I think you chose a wonderful dean [former U.N. Ambassador Kishore Mahbubani]. I was recently there to offer a humble seminar. The quality of the students knocked me out.

Lee: I think that's an investment worth making because [students from the region] will go back and they will tell their media chaps and their leaders and say, look this country works because it's working like this: first, it's honest; second, it's rational; third, it makes decisions and follows through on those decisions. The decisions are made after very careful consideration of all options and consequences.

Q: I agree with you and if you look at the course list, it's a very impressive course list. Now, you were educated in England and many of your top people were educated in America or England, so Western education for a long time has been the cutting edge, has been the leader, the place you wanted to go to. Is it your sense that American higher education is still terrific?

Lee: It will stay like that for as long as you keep on getting talented people into your country and staying on, but will you do that? I think yes for 10, 20 years, but 30, 40, 50 years, I'm not sure because other countries will become more attractive or as attractive. It is the extra inputs you get.

Let me explain how I see it. If Singapore depended on its own domestic talent, we wouldn't have made it, but we were the center for education in this region from British days and many came to be educated and many stayed behind. Our top layer was drawn from a larger base and in my first Cabinet of 10, there were only two of us who were born and bred in Singapore. The others came from Malaysia, China, Ceylon, from India and elsewhere. It's a talent pool that was drawn from a bigger region, and that's the secret of your success. You drew in first your talent from Europe because you offered them opportunities. In the last few decades, you've been drawing your talent from all over the world, including Asia. If you can continue to do that, you will continue to succeed.

Not only must you attract them, you must get them to stay.

Q: How are you doing on that?

Lee: We give a lot of scholarships to Chinese and Indians. If one quarter stay on here in Singapore, we're winners, especially with the Chinese. They come in here, they get an English education, they get our credentials and they're off to America because they know that the grass is greener there. The Indians, strangely enough, more of them stay here in Singapore because they want to go home to visit their families, America is too far away. We are net gainers for how long? I think in the case of China, maybe another 20, 30 years and then the attraction is gone. We can't offer them that difference in opportunities and standards. India, maybe longer -- 50, 60 years before their infrastructure catches up. Anyway, this is not my worry anymore!

Q: On India, there's been a lot of hype in America, in foreign affairs publications and so on, about India becoming the next superpower. I was in New Delhi about three months ago -- it seems to me India's got a long way to go.

Lee: They are a different mix, never mind their political structures. They are not one people. You can make a speech in Delhi; [Prime Minister] Manmohan Singh can speak in Hindi and 30, 40 percent of the country can understand him. He makes a speech in English and maybe 30 percent of the elite understand him.

In China, when a leader speaks, 90 percent will understand him. They all speak one language, they are one people. In India, they have got 32 official languages and in fact, 300-plus different languages. You look at Europe, 25 languages, 27 countries, how do you? The European Parliament? Had we not moved into one language here in Singapore, we would not have been able to govern this country.

Q: Minister Mentor, thank you very much.





^O^

23 Jan 2008

2007 Aug: An interview with Lee Kuan Yew


Excerpts from an interview with Lee Kuan Yew

From:
The International Herald Tribune www.iht.com
Wednesday, August 29, 2007


The following are excerpts from an interview with Lee Kuan Yew, who served as prime minister of Singapore from 1959, when it gained partial independence from Britain, until he stepped down in 1990. He is currently minister mentor.

The interview took place at the Istana, where the Singapore president and prime minister work, on Aug. 24, 2007. Lee was questioned by Leonard M. Apcar, deputy managing editor of the International Herald Tribune, Wayne Arnold, a Singapore correspondent, and Seth Mydans, Southeast Asia bureau chief.


IHT: First, we wanted to talk to you about Singapore's extraordinary growth. We'd also like your assessment of the broader political landscape, China, Southeast Asia, Japan and the United States.

Let's begin, if we could, with the Singapore model. How do you see it evolving in the next several years economically and politically? And what do you think are the challenges and opportunities and even threats for the next generation of leaders?

Lee Kuan Yew: First, to understand Singapore, you've got to start off with an improbable story. It should not exist . . . We haven't got the base, the space, the wherewithal. This is not Jamaica or Bahamas or Fiji. This is a little island strategically placed at the southernmost end of Asia connecting the sea routes between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.

Suddenly, we're on our own. (After being ejected in 1965 from Malaysia which followed the end of British colonial rule.) We have to defend ourselves. We have to make a living without a hinterland. We've got to have a Foreign Ministry. It's one thing running Hong Kong under British or Chinese protection; it's another matter governing tiny Singapore. You have to build an army, navy, air force, control and command systems, early warning, AWACs in the sky and so on.

So, can we survive? The question is still unanswered. We have survived so far, 42 years. Will we survive for another 42? It depends upon world conditions. It doesn't depend on us alone.

If there were no international law and order, and big fish eat small fish and small fish eat shrimps, we wouldn't exist. Our armed forces can withstand an attack and inflict damage for two weeks, three weeks, but a siege? (laughs)

IHT: Not possible.

Lee Kuan Yew: Control of sea lanes? We'll just starve. So, it depends on whether there is an international environment which says that borders are sacrosanct and there is the rule of law. It's not just [a matter for the] United Nations Security Council. There's the U.S. Seventh Fleet, a Japanese interest in the Straits of Malacca, and later Chinese and Indian interests in the region, and therefore a balance.

So, these are imponderables. But what is absolutely essential is to survive, never mind the military and security side. More important is the economic prospects. We have to be very different from our neighbors. That was the first shock we had. Because we thought by joining Malaysia, we'd go back to the old Singapore. We would have a hinterland, a common market, and can develop import substitution industries like other countries. Now, we're off on our own with not the most sympathetic of neighbors. How do we live?

To begin with we don't have the ingredients of a nation, the elementary factors, a homogenous population, common language, common culture and common destiny.

We are migrants from southern China, southern India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, before it was divided, Ceylon and the archipelago. So, the problem was, can we keep these peoples together?

The basis of a nation just was not there. But the advantage we had was that we became independent late. In 1965, we had 20 years of examples of failed states. So, we knew what to avoid - racial conflict, linguistic strife, religious conflict. We saw Ceylon.

Thereafter, we knew that if we embarked on any of these romantic ideas, to revive a mythical past of greatness and culture, we'd be damned. So, there's no return to nativism. We have left our moorings. We're all stranded here to make a better or worse living than in our own original countries.

IHT: What you're describing now is the basis for the formation of the type of country and society that you formed. And also, then, the types of criticisms that come toward Singapore - the answers may lie in these same . . .

Lee Kuan Yew: The answer lies in our genesis. To survive, we have to do these things. And although what you see today - the superstructure of a modern city, the base is a very narrow one and could easily disintegrate.

We are not Venice. We are not Athens with wide open spaces and far away neighbors. We are part of a world which is globalized, cheek by jowl with teeming millions in the region, populating at fast speed (laughs), right?

IHT: Control of many things including information and openness is the area in which Singapore is most often criticized.

Lee Kuan Yew: Well, we are pragmatists. If, in order to survive, we have to open up a sector, we open it up. Because the best test - the yardstick is, is this necessary for survival and progress? If it is, let's do it.

I don't like casinos but the world has changed and if we don't have an integrated resort like the ones in Las Vegas - Las Vegas Sands - we'll lose. So, let's go. Let's try and still keep it safe and mafia-free and prostitution-free and money-laundering-free.

Can we do it? I'm not sure but we're going to give it a good try and we're going to keep our clean and green and safe reputation. That's the plan.

IHT: You and others have also talked about the need to open Singapore up a little bit more in the modern world of fast moving technology and information and communications.

Lee Kuan Yew: No other way.

IHT: No other way. But this is going slowly. Former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong talked about thinking and acting like revolutionaries. It was very hard to decree looseness and boldness. But is this a direction that you would like to go in?

Lee Kuan Yew: No, I think we have to go in whatever direction world conditions dictate if we are to survive and to be part of this modern world. If we are not connected to this modern world, we are dead. We'll go back to the fishing village we once were.

IHT: The marketplace of ideas is so often discussed outside of Singapore. You have said it is a beneficial notion so that there will be a ferment and growth. But . . .

Lee Kuan Yew: If we don't have that stimulus, if we are not connected to the world and know what's going on, how could we keep abreast of it? How can we know where the action is? Where are the expanding sectors we should be in?

IHT: But won't that require a greater opening up of society here? A loosening of the press, of free speech, of political competition?

Lee Kuan Yew: You're giving me the classical . . .

IHT: I am, I want to . . .

Lee Kuan Yew: No, the classical, Western, liberal approach.

IHT: It's not my practice . . .

Lee Kuan Yew: No, no. It's the Western, classical, liberal approach.

IHT: Right.

Lee Kuan Yew: I'm giving you the answer of a pragmatist.

IHT: That's what I want to hear.

Lee Kuan Yew: For the top 20 percent of the population, there are no constraints there. I would say . . . top 20 percent, the educated population. They're educated abroad, at university.

So, they know the wide world and they are on the Internet and they've got friends, they e-mail them. They travel. Every year, about 50 percent of Singaporeans travel by air.

So, this is not a closed society. But at the same time, we try to maintain a certain balance with the people who are not finding it so comfortable to suddenly find the world changed, their world, their sense of place, their sense of position in society.

We call them the heartlanders in the HDB estates [government housing developments], the people who live in three- and four-room flats. Three and four rooms are the lowest end. Five rooms and the executives are the upper end.

And so we have this dichotomy. You can read the analysis by our academics who wrote that we are using the heartlanders to keep progress in check.

But they have not governed the place. (laughs) The academics, they write these things from abstract analysis. Like gays, we take an ambiguous position. We say, O.K., leave them alone but let's leave the law as it is for the time being and let's have no gay parades.

IHT: Don't ask, don't tell?

Lee Kuan Yew: Yes, we've got to go the way the world is going. China has already allowed and recognized gays, so have Hong Kong and Taiwan.

It's a matter of time. But we have a part Muslim population, another part conservative older Chinese and Indians. So, let's go slowly. It's a pragmatic approach to maintain social cohesion.

IHT: How much do you worry about the gradual, slow evolution for the generation of leaders behind you now? Do you truly worry about survival for this country?

Lee Kuan Yew: Yes, I do.

Because of the vulnerability, the unnatural base. You know, our total trade - external trade is three and a half times our GDP [gross domestic product]. It's more than Hong Kong's. Hong Kong is part of China.

We are not part of Indonesia or Malaysia. Our trade is more with the U.S., Europe, Japan and China than with Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand.

IHT: But over the years, over your generation of leadership, those alliances - economic, political - worked very well for you in this country. Yes, the world is changing but you have longstanding relationships, corporate investment, foreign investment in this country and jobs created. There are permanent institutional channels of money, jobs and growth here.

Lee Kuan Yew: (laughs) That means, you don't understand. They are here because we've provided security, stability and predictability. If that sense of security and predictability is gone, the money will stop flowing in and will flow out.

IHT: We've written a lot about the competition for jobs and foreign investments. When it comes to China, it's obviously a great opportunity. But what other pressures do you see emanating from China for the rest of Asia?

Lee Kuan Yew: The next 10, 15 years, China is more an opportunity than a challenge. In the next 15, 20, 30 years, the opportunities will be taken up by many other competitors in China. The challenge will come when they start exporting not just low-end products but intermediate products and even some high-end products and software. And they will begin to export their expertise, exporting their factories and plants.

IHT: What about politically? There's always this talk of China seeing itself as the Middle Kingdom still. Does China have long-term ambitions in Asia that cause concern to the rest of the region?

Lee Kuan Yew: Well, there are memories, not institutionalized but in folk memories at a popular level. For instance when the Sultan of Brunei went to Beijing, about 10 years ago. They took him to his great-great-grandfather's mausoleum in Nanjing where he had died, when bringing tribute to China.

It was a neat way of reminding the Bruneians and the rest of us - Brunei was then a big empire in West Borneo - that this was our place in the pecking order.

So this question mark. What kind of a relationship will it be? Because of technology, the other great powers are not far away. So it's a different equation now than it was. That was China when there were no steam ships, no aircraft and an unpopulated America.

Present day China faces a very advanced North America, Europe, Japan and a fairly developed Southeast Asia and India. So it's a different world, and our expectation is - we've got to see how it turns out - that the generation that takes over in China, in say 30 years will be of a different mind-set. Because they would have been educated abroad and be completely different from their forbears.

They would've gone abroad and traveled widely and be very familiar with the English language. They would also know that although by 2050 China will be the biggest economy in GNP terms [gross national product] per capita, they are still small, and technologically they are still way behind.

So to get there, they must have a sense of realism - which the present leadership has. For them to make that grade, they've got to be like us with a very keen sense of what is possible and what is not.

They must know that to dominate this region is not possible.

IHT: Politically, regarding the balance you're talking about, does it concern you that the preoccupation of the United States now is with events in the Middle East?

Lee Kuan Yew: Yes, I think it's a real drag slowing down adjusting to the new situation.

Without this draining of energy, attention and resources for Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, there would have been deep thinking about the long-term trends - working out possible options that the U.S. could exercise to change the direction of long-term trends more in its favor.

IHT: Right. Is this a long-term problem for this region? The removal of attention of the United States?

Lee Kuan Yew: I don't think it's a total removal. It's just that pre-emptive options have not been thought through. Day-to-day attention to moving things forward - that goes on because of the machine. Your ambassadors are here. Your chambers of commerce are here. Your State Department, trade and Treasury and so on, they are on the ball in keeping the shop going.

But look at the Chinese - they are acting more decisively than the Japanese. They are making strategic decisions on their relations with the region and they were an economically backward country.

They decided sometime in the late 1990s that they required good relations with Southeast Asia and Asean [Association of Southeast Asian Nations]. So Zhu Rongji [former prime minister of China] went to Brunei for an Asean meeting and put on the table a free trade agreement with Asean.

Totally their initiative. They also stopped challenging this reef or that reef, or whatever Mischief Reef [part of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea]. Let's go jointly in oil exploration. Of course it's not all sweetness. At the same time there's some jostling between naval ships.

But they're maintaining a very different posture. It took some time for the Asean countries to really believe that this free trade was a serious offer. Now it's on. For products it's already done. You take first advantage or "early harvesting." And if it's unfair, we can revise it later on.

Why? Because this will lock us into their [China's] markets.

I had told Charlene Barshefsky - Clinton's trade rep - about 12 years ago. I said, "Better move before these chaps move, because look at their size!" In the end she moved but the free trade area was only with Singapore and with high hurdles which the others in Asean could not clear.

On the other hand the Chinese made a strategic decision and overruled trade and industry or whatever local domestic power groups, and said, "This is a strategic necessity - move."

And you've got to match this.

IHT: But as the American situation now stands in Iraq, there is going to be trouble, whichever way things go. And if the United States is not there to moderate . . .

Lee Kuan Yew: You cannot leave and have chaos ensue. Even with a Democrat president, the day after he or she has won the elections on the second Tuesday in November, he/she will be given all the briefing papers, and the consequences of various options, and he/she will know that if you pull out precipitously, the long-term, the permanent price can be horrendous! You've got to at least keep a stabilizing force and put pressure on the neighbors to come to some agreed configuration of an Iraq that will be stable and not threatening to any neighbor.

IHT: I want to get back to India for the moment. You talked about it in positive, growing terms. How do you assess its potential as a regional and international power?

Lee Kuan Yew: India's economy can grow to about 60-70 percent that of China. I see that as the long-term trend. They're not going to be bigger than China - on present projections.

But 60-70 percent of China with a population which will be bigger than China by 2050, is something considerable, and they've some very able people at the top. I draw this historical lesson which I believe will be repeated, though not in exactly the same way, but will manifest itself in a similar pattern.

If you study the history of this region, you will see that two influences came from the north.

One was India from the west; the other was China from the east. So you have the Ramayana Classics, the dances and music in Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia. You have Borobudur and Hindu-like temples in Bali. Then in the east you have Vietnam, and then the seaports of the region, pockets of Chinese traders.

So historically, two forces were at work, two higher civilizations India and China from the north flowed into this region. Then European colonialism took over for 200 years.

Now, China and India have revived. I believe the outward thrust of their influence will follow a similar pattern.

IHT: Do you think this will be a smooth and positive expansion? Or do you think that it's na�ve to believe that this won't cause and create an increasing number of conflicts in the future?

Lee Kuan Yew: I don't think we can say that we will be conflict-free. I believe it will be conflict-free between big powers because it's too costly for them. But between big powers against small powers - the squeezing of small powers - that will go on. And between small powers themselves, the small will squeeze the smaller.

But I do not believe hostilities are worth anybody's while. If present conditions prevail where there is international rule of law, a United Nations Security Council, and a balance of power in the region. There is also the International Court of Justice - International Arbitration court, et cetera.

Two lessons give us some comfort. One was Cambodia; the Vietnamese had to withdraw. The other was East Timor; the Indonesians had to withdraw. So these borders are not just lines drawn on a map. You cannot breach them without international consequences.

IHT: And this would be something that is on your mind . . .

Lee Kuan Yew: Yes. Of course.

IHT: With your location here?

Lee Kuan Yew: Absolutely! As I told you. Our armed forces can withstand it - can inflict damage on an invader for two weeks, three weeks. But a siege?

IHT: So do you just throw up your hands and say, "Well, we have certain defenses, we have economic alliances, we have certain benefits? But long term I don't know the answer to our survival?"

Lee Kuan Yew: No, I don't know. If this international world order collapses, then I say, "All bets are off." But will it collapse? Can it? Can the world afford to allow it to collapse and go into anarchy?

IHT: It has before.

Lee Kuan Yew: But before there wasn't the present technology on transportation and communication. You in America could ignore large parts of the world. Why do you worry about what's happening to the Aborigines of Australia, or natives in the Congo or the Amerindians in South America. They do not concern you.

But this interconnected world is not going to become disconnected. Technology has brought this about. I do not see that technology disappearing. I think the problems will become more acute the other way, overpopulation, earth warming and displacement of millions, maybe billions of people, that is the greater danger.

IHT: What about the risks to Singapore, what are the risks to Singapore in those scenarios?

Lee Kuan Yew: Oh! We are already in consultations with Delft in Holland to learn how we can build dikes!

IHT: Is that right?

Lee Kuan Yew: Oh, yes! Let's start thinking about it now.

IHT: Are you serious?

Lee Kuan Yew: We are. We are in consultations with them.

It scares me because many world leaders have not woken up to the peril that their populations are in.

This melting ice cap. I expected great consternation! What would happen to this earth? But, no. Has it triggered off emergency meetings to do something about this?

Earth warming, the glaciers melting away? Never mind the Swiss Alps and skiing resorts having to manufacture snow. When the glaciers in the Himalayas and Tibet melt away, the Ganges, the Yangtze, the Irrawaddy, the Mekong, may dry up, except for rainy seasons. What will happen to the hundreds of millions? Where do they go? Where can they go? This will be a very serious problem.

IHT: Why don't you think the world isn't focusing on this?

Lee Kuan Yew: Because it's not an election issue. You know maybe 50 years, a 100 years, most of us would be dead. Leave it to the next president.

IHT: That's human nature isn't it? But it doesn't seem to be the way Singapore operates. You're taking a lot of pains . . .

Lee Kuan Yew: Because we are too vulnerable. If the water goes up by one meter, we can have dikes and save ourselves. If the water goes up by three, four, five meters, (laughs) what will happen to us? Half of Singapore will disappear! The valuable half - the seafronts!

Well, let us say, it has gone up to one meter and we have protected ourselves. But our neighboring islands have disappeared! And then Indonesia may not have 30,000 islands - many will be under water.

IHT: Yeah, so what's the answer to that, cap and trade [referring to a program to cap emissions and trade pollution allowances] or can you somehow tax industry a carbon tax of some sort?

Lee Kuan Yew: If you ask me, I think you can ameliorate this problem. But you cannot solve it. Because our dependency on energy will only grow - can only grow. I do not see any tribal leader, any democratic leader, any dictator telling his people, "We are going to forgo growth. We are going to consume less. Travel less. Live a more spartan life and we'll save the earth."

But I see a need to mitigate wherever we can through green technologies. Less CO2 and try to prolong the period of adjustment.

IHT: Can I come back to something that I just want to close the loop so I understand exactly what you're saying. We talked about openness and whatnot. And you said, "Oh for the top 20 percent or so of Singaporean society, it's open. Fifty percent travel, the rest are educated. They know the West. They're connected. Openness for them is a matter of . . .

Lee Kuan Yew: It's a fact!

IHT: It's a fact. But what I don't quite follow is that are you saying that over time this will permeate Singaporean society as well? I'm not sure I understand that . . .

Lee Kuan Yew: I'm not sure how it will develop. Let me explain why I say I'm not sure. We are placed in a very unusual environment. And you cannot divorce yourself from your environment. Right?

If we were Malta, we would have joined the European Union, we would have a different backdrop. But we are Asean. And you've got to live with your neighbors, neighbors at a different level of societal development. What they think and do has to be factored into consideration to decide what we can do.

IHT: Let me connect one more thought here that I am not clear about. In this more open, interconnected world where the educated and the elites are traveling and easily moving all over the world, what does this do to Asian values? Does it inevitably dilute them?

Lee Kuan Yew: It's already diluted and we can see it in the difference between the generations. It's inevitable. One of the things we did which we knew would call for a big price was to switch from our own languages into English.

We had Chinese, Malay, Indian schools - separate language medium schools. The British ran a small English school sector to produce clerks, storekeepers, teachers for the British. Had we chosen Chinese, which was our majority language, we would have perished, economically and politically.

Riots - we've seen Sri Lanka, when they switched from English to Sinhalese and disenfranchised the Tamils and so strife ever after.

We chose - we didn't say it was our national language - we said it was our working language, that everybody learns English whatever language medium school you go to. Which means nobody needs interpretation to read English.

So, our sources of culture, literature, ideas are now more from the English text than from the Chinese or the Malay or the Tamil.

So, there's a clear difference between the grandfathers and the grandchildren. Look, my grandchildren, never mind the grandfather, their Chinese is not equal to their parents' Chinese.

My children were educated in what were then Chinese schools and they learned English as a subject. But they made up when they went to English-language universities. So they didn't lose out. They had a basic set of traditional Confucian values. Not my grandchildren.

I've got one grandson gone to MIT. Another grandson had been in the American school here. Because he was dyslexic and we then didn't have the teachers to teach him how to overcome or cope with his dyslexia, so he was given exemption to go to the American school. He speaks like an American. He's going to Wharton.

Between him and his father, there's a clear breach in cultural continuity - never mind between him and me.

But that's the top 20 percent, right?

For the majority in the heartlands, they don't go to American schools or have that exposure. But from 20, it will become 30 percent going to tertiary institutions, universities.

You asked me to predict what it will be in 50 years or even 20 years. I cannot, because we have left our moorings.

IHT: Let me just make a point here. I've read your second book, where you get into a lot of these issues ["From Third World to First, Singapore 1965-2000" HarperCollins, 2000]. Is it the Internet? Is it wisdom?

Lee Kuan Yew: No, it is the inevitability of modern society, as they travel, as they - the world is changing around us every day.

IHT: That's the circle that I wanted to close. You talked about fighting for survival at the beginning of our talk. And the theme that's run through the rest of our talk has also been anticipating and defending against possible threats and dangers. That's really what Singapore is about, in some ways.

Is it fighting for survival?

Lee Kuan Yew: It is. Yes.

IHT: And you, as a fighter, beginning your career as a fighter for - you've just kept on yourself, still fighting -

Lee Kuan Yew: Let me put it like this. You do what you can in your lifetime. And as I went into my 70s I did less, and in my 80s I'm doing even less.

You can be the greatest leader in the world. You cannot determine what your people and your country are going to face in subsequent years, because forces are at work which will play out in a different way.

So Churchill made a Herculean effort to save the British Isles and the British Empire, but - the forces were already set in motion for the dissolution of that empire and making Britain an island off Europe.

Stalin thought he had created the world's biggest empire at the end of WWII in 1945. But it was dissolved in 1991. So, history is a long time. I've done my bit. By that I mean I've only done what I could and had to do, I've also ensured succession, so that the system will continue to work.

And fortunately, my successor also ensured his succession. Now, it's up to the present team to make sure that there's a generation that can look after Singaporeans in different circumstances, maybe more trying than those we faced, because it will be a radically different world and a more demanding people.

The present generation say this is the base line. Now we want more and better, and the leaders have to produce.

IHT: This system, machinery of government here in Singapore is looked on as a model all over the world. Are you confident that it can survive indefinitely or does it face problems that some companies face? For example, when they try to expand, they start to lose their edge. They start to lose their competitiveness.

Lee Kuan Yew: Well, I cannot say that we will not lose it. If we lose it, then we're done in. We go back to where we started, right?

We knew that if we were just like our neighbors, we would die. Because we've got nothing to offer against what they have to offer. So we had to produce something which is different and better than what they have. It's incorrupt. It's efficient. It's meritocratic. It works.

The system works regardless of your race, language or religion because otherwise we'd have divisions. We are pragmatists. We don't stick to any ideology. Does it work? Let's try it and if it does work, fine, let's continue it. If it doesn't work, toss it out, try another one. We are not enamored with any ideology.

Let the historians and the Ph.D. students work out their doctrines. I'm not interested in theories per se.

IHT: But a lot of these reflect your personality - the force of your personality.

Lee Kuan Yew: No, no. A lot of it is the result of the problems we face and a team of us - I wasn't a loner. I had some very powerful minds working with me. And we sat down and thought through our options. Take this matter of getting MNCs [multinational corporations] to come here when the developing world expert economists said, "No, MNCs are exploiters."

I went to America. This was a happenstance . . . What were the Americans doing? They were exporting their manufacturing capabilities . . . That's what I wanted. That's how it started.

I said O.K., let's make this a first world oasis in a third world region. So not only will they come here to set up plants and manufacture, they will also come here and from here explore the region.

What do we need to attract them? First class infrastructure. Where do we get it from? We had the savings from our Central Provident Fund. We had some loans from the World Bank.

We built up the infrastructure. The difficult part was getting the people to change their habits so that they behaved more like first world citizens, not like third world citizens spitting and littering all over the place.

That was the difficult part. So, we had campaigns to do this, campaigns to do that. We said, "Look, if you don't do this, you won't get the jobs. You must make this place like the countries they came from. Then, they are comfortable. Then they'll do business here. Then, you'll have a job. Then, you'll have homes, schools, hospitals, etc." That's a long process.

IHT: I'll come back to where I began. It was a model that was admired and respected around the world for generations and will be for a long time. Do you ever feel though, looking back, were there times where you'd overreached?

Lee Kuan Yew: (laughs) . . . So many times where we could have made more deft moves. But, given the circumstances at that time and the pressure to get things done, we did the best we could given the facts and the circumstances we were in.

IHT: Well, what about your opponents? Do you ever feel that, looking back now, maybe I didn't have to go that far?

Lee Kuan Yew: My political opponents, you mean?

IHT: Uhm-hmm.

Lee Kuan Yew: No, I don't think so. I never killed them. I never destroyed them. Politically, they destroyed themselves.

IHT: To what extent can you replicate the Singapore model in other countries? Does it work?

Lee Kuan Yew: Supposing we had oil and gas, do you think I could get the people to do this? No. If I had oil and gas I'd have a different people, with different motivations and expectations. It's because we don't have oil and gas and they know that we don't have, and they know that this progress comes from their efforts. So please do it and do it well.

We are ideology-free. What would make the place work, let's do it.

IHT: Thank you.


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